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INFLATABLE LIENS AND LIKE PHENOMENA:
CONVERTING UNSECURED OBLIGATIONS
INTO SECURED DEBT UNDER
U.C.C. ARTICLE 9 AND THE
BANKRUPTCY CODE
Harry M. Flechtner t
Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, a security
agreement can cover what might be called "after-secured obliga-
tions"-claims not secured by a security interest until after the in-
terest attaches.' For instance, the 1962 version of Article 9
sanctioned coverage of "future advances," an undefined term ap-
parently referring to new value given by the secured party after the
original advance covered by the security agreement. The 1972
amendments to Article 9 added a series of priority rules to deal with
such advances. Future advances, however, represent only one type
of after-secured obligation.
Article 9 security agreements, as well as real property mort-
gages,2 can cover obligations converted from unsecured to secured
status after the original security interest provided for in the agree-
ment has attached. For example, agreements containing broadly-
drafted "dragnet clauses," providing that collateral secures all cur-
rent and future indebtedness between the parties, 3 may reach claims
the secured party acquired by assignment after the parties executed
t Assistant Professor, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. A.B. 1973, Harvard
College; A.M. 1975, Harvard University; J.D. 1981, Harvard University School of Law.
This article grew out of a project for Professor Ven Countryman's Corporation Reor-
ganizations seminar at Harvard Law School. The author gratefully acknowledges Profes-
sor Countryman's valuable guidance in the article's early stages and thanks Professors
John Murray and Edward Symons of the University of Pittsburgh School of Law for their
insightful comments on later drafts. The author also expresses gratitude to Pittsburgh
Law School student Eric Wittenberg for diligent, reliable, and intelligent research.
I One commentator has used the term "floating debt" to describe "claims which [a
secured party] acquired after the execution of a security agreement." Justice, Secured
Transactions-What Floats Can Be Sunk, 24 VILL. L. REv. 867, 896 (1979). Because it is
difficult to see how such debt "floats," the phrase "after-secured obligations" seems
preferable.
2 This article deals primarily with security interests in personal property governed
by Article 9 of the U.C.C. The issues discussed, however, often arise in connection with
real property mortgages, see cases cited infra notes 49, 59, & 62 and accompanying text,
and much of the Article 9 analysis contained herein also applies to mortgages.
3 2 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 35.2 at 917-18
(1965); Justice, supra note 1, at 897.
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the security agreement. Such an agreement gives rise to what might
be called an "inflatable lien"-a security interest that permits the
secured party to expand the amount of secured indebtedness by tak-
ing assignments of claims against the debtor.4
Armed with such a clause, an oversecured creditor may appro-
priate the debtor's equity in collateral by asserting rights the debtor
did not intend to convey. Because Article 9 dates priority in many
situations from the time a financing statement is filed, 5 such a credi-
tor may "squeeze out" third parties who have obtained an interest
in the property. In some cases the priority Article 9 apparently af-
fords after-secured obligations is unjustified, and the power to
''squeeze out" other claimants to the collateral encourages abusive
behavior. These problems are exacerbated where the debtor has
become insolvent. The bankruptcy laws designed to control oppor-
tunistic behavior by secured creditors often depend on non-bank-
ruptcy priority rules. Thus Article 9's failure to deal sensibly with
after-secured obligations may permit an oversecured party to
purchase unsecured claims against a bankrupt at a discount, reaping
windfall profits at the expense of the debtor's other creditors.
In attacking such abuses, courts and commentators have issued
broad condemnations that threaten legitimate transactions. Inflat-
able liens and similar devices permitting unsecured debt to be con-
verted into secured obligations under a preexisting security
agreement can serve legitimate purposes. The ability to "convert"
certain unsecured claims can reduce the costs of secured lending by
creating flexibility to meet the bewildering variety of circumstances
requiring such financing. It is unwise, therefore, to declare all con-
version arrangements unenforceable. Applicable doctrine should
distinguish between abusive and nonabusive uses of these devices
and afford the latter appropriate protection. Without such a distinc-
tion, the law thwarts desirable developments in secured financing
techniques and defeats the reasonable expectations of parties who
have employed conversion arrangements in good faith.
A policy-oriented approach to after-secured obligations, such as
that proposed in the Appendix, can protect proper uses of conver-
sion devices while discouraging abusive behavior. To guard against
oppression of the debtor who did not intend to give a secured party
the power to convert, any reform must condition enforceability of
4 "Inflatable liens" should be distinguished from "floating liens," which are secu-
rity interests covering after-acquired collateral. The distinctive feature of a floating lien
is the collateral; the distinctive feature of an inflatable lien is the obligation secured. An
inflatable lien can attach to any kind of permitted collateral, whether or not "after-ac-
quired." The U.C.C. generally permits floating liens, U.G.C. § 9-204(1) (1977), but no
provision in Article 9 specifically deals with inflatable liens.
5 E.g., U.C.C. §§ 9-312(5), (7), 9-313(4) (1977).
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conversion arrangements on the debtor's actual assent thereto. To
protect third parties, the priority rules applicable to converted debt
must distinguish obligations arising from new value advanced in re-
liance on the conversion agreement, which are the functional
equivalents of direct future advances and deserve equivalent prior-
ity, from "nonreliance" claims. Affording the latter retroactive pri-
ority under the rules applicable to future advances merely opens the
door to manipulation and abuse by secured creditors. A state law
priority scheme that made the suggested distinction would remove
most obstacles to the proper regulation of conversion arrangements
under federal bankruptcy law.
I
THE PROBLEM: INFLATABLE LIENS AND VARIANTS
A. Inflatable Liens
Consider the following situation ("Hypothetical A"): 6 in 1984,
Lender advances $50,000 to Debtor, secured by a security interest
in equipment worth $100,000. Lender immediately files a financing
statement. The security agreement contains a dragnet clause pro-
viding that the collateral secures "all debts owing by Debtor to
Lender now existing or hereafter arising, including all debts owed
by Debtor to others that Lender has obtained or will obtain by as-
signment or otherwise."' 7 In 1985, Bank lends Debtor $10,000 se-
cured by a junior security interest in the equipment, and Bank
immediately perfects by filing. On May 15, 1986, Tortvictim, who
had obtained a $20,000 judgment against debtor, levies on the
equipment. Debtor becomes insolvent in June, 1986. On August
15, 1986, Creditor, who had previously lent Debtor $50,000 on an
unsecured basis, responds to rumors about Debtor's financial condi-
tion by assigning its claim to Lender in exchange for $5,000. On
August 28, Debtor files a voluntary petition under Chapter 7 of the
Bankruptcy Code.8 The value of the equipment remains $100,000.
Lender submits a $100,000 claim, arguing that the entire amount is
a first-priority secured claim under Section 506 of the Bankruptcy
Code.9
Lender will assert that its security interest in Debtor's equip-
ment covers both the original advance and the claim obtained from
6 Hypothetical A is a somewhat more elaborate version of a situation suggested in
Shanor, A New Deal for Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy, 28 EMORY LJ. 587, 607 (1979).
7 This language is adapted from a clause in the security agreement at issue in In re
E.A. Fretz Co., 565 F.2d 366 (5th Cir. 1978) (discussed infra text accompanying notes 75-
88).
8 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-76 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
9 Id. § 506 (1982).
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Creditor. In addition, Lender will argue that it has priority over
both Bank and Tortvictim as to its entire $100,000 claim under the
provisions of Article 9. If these arguments succeed and if nothing in
the Bankruptcy Code prevents the result, Lender will have contrived
a windfall profit of $45,000 at the expense of Bank and Tortvictim
(who will be left with mere unsecured claims10) and Debtor's other
unsecured creditors (whose recovery will no longer include the
$20,000 in "excess" collateral value). The success of Lender's ma-
neuver would, among other things, circumvent established bank-
ruptcy principles: if on August 15 Debtor had merely granted
Lender a new security interest to cover the claim acquired from
Creditor, the transaction would be voidable as a preference under
section 547 of the Bankruptcy Code.11
Two aspects of Lender's maneuver deserve particular attention.
First, Lender's attempt to bring unsecured claims purchased from
third parties within an existing security agreement is not normal
commercial practice. Thus, one could question whether Lender and
Debtor actually contemplated this possibility when they executed
the security agreement. Furthermore, Lender did not have a reason-
able expectation based on business usage that the priority of its se-
curity interest extended to a claim assigned to Lender after the liens
of Bank and Tortvictim had attached, or that a bankruptcy court
would recognize the validity of the interest securing the assigned
claim. Thus, the burden should be on Lender to justify its behavior
and the claimed consequences.
Second, the success of Lender's maneuver would radically alter
the distribution of Debtor's estate. Assume, for example, that
Debtor had no assets other than the collateral and a total of
$150,000 in unsecured liabilities in addition to the $50,000 obliga-
tion assigned to Lender. Had Creditor not assigned its claim,
Lender would receive $50,000 in satisfaction of its original secured
claim, Bank would receive full payment of its $10,000 claim,
Tortvictim's $20,000 judgment would be satisfied, and the remain-
ing $20,000 of assets would be distributed pro rata among $200,000
in unsecured claims, for a recovery of ten cents on the dollar for the
unsecured claimants.' 2 If Lender's maneuver succeeds, however,
10 Under section 506(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, id., "An allowed claim of a credi-
tor secured by a lien on property in which the estate has an interest ... is an unsecured
claim to the extent that the value of such creditor's interest [in the estate's interest in
such property] . . . is less than the amount of such allowed claim." Because Lender's
claim would exhaust the value of the collateral and thereby render the liens of Bank and
Tortvictim valueless, Lender's success would make the claims of Bank and Tortvictim
"unsecured" within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code.
I 1 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
12 The same distribution would result if Creditor assigned its claim to Lender but
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Lender will receive full payment of its $100,000 secured claim, leav-
ing nothing for the unsecured creditors (who would now include
Bank and Tortvictim).
The question is whether this departure from the norm can be
justified. In certain circumstances, Article 9 grants future advance
lenders priority over intervening interests in the collateral in order
to facilitate secured future advance lending. Bankruptcy law recog-
nizes the rights of secured parties in order to preserve the system of
secured financing. These purposes do not justify giving Lender pri-
ority over Bank and Tortvictim as to the claim acquired from Credi-
tor, nor do they justify treating that claim as secured in bankruptcy,
because the claim assigned to Lender does not represent credit ex-
tended to Debtor in reliance on a security interest in the collateral.
Despite these objections, Lender's maneuver may succeed
under current law. If the dragnet clause creating Lender's inflatable
lien is clear enough, courts may enforce it even if Debtor never actu-
ally intended to grant an inflatable lien. If Lender has such a lien,
furthermore, it can reasonably argue that Article 9 gives it priority
over other parties whose interest in the collateral arose before the
assignment of Creditor's claim. These priority arguments, in turn,
may shield Lender's maneuver from the avoiding powers of
Lender's security agreement did not reach claims acquired by assignment. Lender
would have a $50,000 secured claim that would be paid in full and a $50,000 unsecured
claim that, like the other unsecured claims, would be paid at ten cents on the dollar
($5,000) after the claims of Bank and Tortvictim had been satisfied. Creditor would
have already received $5,000, but this would not affect the distribution in bankruptcy.
Bankruptcy law ignores the transaction between Lender and Creditor for purposes of
distribution. Thus, the bankruptcy distribution would not be changed if Lender had
paid more or less than $5,000 for Creditor's claim: the amount paid merely reflects the
value that Creditor and Lender placed on the claim.
If Lender had made a future advance of $5,000 to be used by Debtor to settle Credi-
tor's claim, Lender would have a $55,000 secured claim. The $15,000 in collateral re-
maining after Bank and Tortvictim were paid would be distributed among $150,000 in
unsecured claims, again permitting payment at ten cents on the dollar. Debtor's pay-
ment to Creditor could not be avoided as a preference because it did not permit Credi-
tor to recover more than it would have in a Chapter 7 liquidation of Debtor.
(Specifically, Creditor received $5,000, the same amount it would have received on its
$50,000 claim in a liquidation proceeding.) Thus, the payment would not satisfy
§ 547(b)(5) of the Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(5) (1982).
If Debtor had settled Creditor's claim for an amount greater than $5,000 within the
preference period established by § 547(b)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C.
§ 547(b)(4) (1982 & Supp. III 1985), preference law would operate to restore the distri-
bution to unsecured creditors. Hence, if Creditor and Debtor had settled for $10,000
(borrowed as a future advance from Lender), Lender would have a $60,000 secured
claim, leaving only $10,000 (after Bank and Tortvictim are paid) to be distributed to
Creditors with $150,000 in unsecured claims. The $10,000 payment to Creditor, how-
ever, could be recovered as a preference if Debtor was insolvent at the time of the pay-
ment, producing $20,000 to be distributed among $200,000 in unsecured claims
(including Creditor's $50,000 claim revived by the preference recovery) for a recovery,
once again, of ten cents on the dollar.
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Debtor's bankruptcy trustee. If the trustee attempts to avoid the
lien securing the assigned claim as a preference, for instance,
Lender can plausibly argue that the elements required for avoidance
are not present.' 3
Lender's arguments can be overcome by a careful, policy-ori-
ented interpretation of current law. The response to abuses of in-
flatable liens and similar arrangements, however, must also protect
similar but legitimate transactions. Consider the facts of Shaw v.
Walter E. Heller & Co. 14 Some 16 months before the debtor,
Bemporad Carpet Mills, declared bankruptcy, Heller granted it a
$430,000 line of credit. 15 The credit line was guaranteed by a sub-
sidiary of debtor and secured by duly perfected security interests in
real property and equipment of Bemporad and the subsidiary. The
security deeds providing for these interests contained broad dragnet
clauses reaching "any... indebtedness of whatever kind or charac-
ter, whether otherwise secured or not, that may be owing by Gran-
tor to Grantee."'16 Heller also factored most of Bemporad's
accounts receivable. The factoring agreement provided that Heller
could charge against factored receivables "[a]ny amounts owing by
you to us for merchandise purchased from any concern factored or
financed by Us.'
7
When its financial condition worsened and suppliers balked at
shipping on credit, Bemporad turned to Heller for assistance. Four
of Bemporad's suppliers also factored their receivables with Heller,
and Heller found a simple solution: it agreed to purchase the suppli-
ers' receivables arising from shipments to Bemporad. Heller was
aware of Bemporad's difficulties18 and assumed that its security in-
terests secured payment of the assigned claims. 19 The District
Court held that the receivables Heller purchased were secured and
13 Section 547 of the Bankruptcy Code requires that the transfer be made during a
specified period before bankruptcy and on account of an "antecedent" debt. 11 U.S.C.
§ 547(b) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). Because preference law looks to priority over lien
creditors to determine when a transfer occurs, see id. § 547(e), Lender can argue that
these requirements are not met. See infra text accompanying notes 151-62.
14 258 F. Supp. 394 (N.D. Ga. 1966), rev'd on other grounds, 385 F.2d 353 (5th Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1003 (1968). See infra note 20.
15 Actually, Heller granted debtor the line of credit 16 months before Bemporad's
second bankruptcy filing. In fact, the arrangements described in the text were part of a
reorganization plan executed in connection with prior bankruptcy proceedings. 258 F.
Supp. at 396-98.
16 Id. at 396 n.1.
17 Id. at 396 n.2.
18 See id. at 400.
19 "The purchase of supplier's invoices . . . was a continuing business decision
made by Heller, based on its entire 'security' position .... " Id. at 398. A fifth supplier
was not a factoring client of Heller, and Heller induced it to ship by guaranteeing the
account rather than by purchasing receivables. Heller assumed its security interest cov-
ered reimbursement claims against debtor for any amounts paid under this guarantee.
1987]
CORNELL LA W REVIEW
that the transactions did not give rise to voidable preferences, even
though Heller purchased some receivables during the preference
period.2
0
Heller's use of its inflatable lien to convert the suppliers' un-
secured claims into secured obligations was a critical element in a
legitimate attempt to rescue Bemporad. Heller might have loaned
Bemporad the cash needed to pay suppliers, but that would have
required Heller to police disbursement of the proceeds. Alterna-
tively, Heller might have taken title to the goods ordered from sup-
pliers in order to resell them to Bemporad. Taking title would have
put Heller in the business of brokering supplies, exposing it to po-
tentially unpleasant tax and corporate law consequences, and would
have required costly and meaningless paperwork. The quickest and
cheapest solution was to purchase the suppliers' receivables.
21
It is perfectly clear that both Bemporad and Heller understood
that Heller's security interest would cover claims assigned by the
suppliers. 22 Furthermore, the suppliers would not have shipped on
credit had Heller not agreed to purchase the resulting receivables.
23
Heller would not have agreed, to purchase the receivables if it did
not believe they were covered by its security interest. Thus the as-
signed receivables in Heller represented value given to the debtor in
reliance on Heller's security interest, equivalent to future advances
by Heller to permit Bemporad to pay suppliers in cash. 24 Protecting
The court said that the arrangements with the fifth supplier "were handled in almost the
same fashion as the other suppliers." Id. at 403.
20 Id. at 404. On appeal, the trustee did not attack the assignments of supplier
accounts to Heller and the court did not address any issues raised by these assignments.
Shaw v. Walter E. Heller & Co., 385 F.2d 353, 356 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied 390 U.S.
1003 (1968). The Fifth Circuit found, however, that the transfer of certain accounts
receivable to Heller during the preference period could be avoided. 385 F.2d at 357-58.
The Fifth Circuit opinion thus exemplifies the preference attack on floating liens under
the 1898 Bankruptcy Act, Ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898) (repealed 1978) an issue that the
new Bankruptcy Code addresses in 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(5), (e)(3) (1982 & Supp. III
1985); see authorities cited infra note 163.
21 For an example of another legitimate use of an inflatable lien, see Lamoille
County Sav. Bank & Trust Co. v. Belden, 90 Vt. 535, 98 A. 1002 (1916) (discussed in
Strong Hardware Co. v. Gonyow, 105 Vt. 415, 418, 168 A. 547, 548 (1933)).
22 When Bemporad and Heller arranged for the secured line of credit they in-
tended $100,000 "to be available for commitments and payments by Heller to
Bemporad's suppliers to induce them to ship raw materials to Bemporad." 258 F. Supp.
at 396. The factoring agreement between Bemporad and Heller specifically covered
claims against Bemporad that were factored by and assigned to Heller. See supra text
accompanying note 17.
23 258 F. Supp. at 402.
24 Indeed, the district court found that the arrangement amounted to a cash sale by
the suppliers that was financed by Heller. 258 F. Supp. at 402. In determining whether
future advances are secured by a mortgage, several courts have looked to whether the
mortgagee relied on the mortgage in making the advance. See, e.g., Union Bank v.
Wendland, 54 Cal. App. 3d 393, 126 Cal. Rptr. 549 (1976); Wright v. Lincoln County
[Vol. 72:696702
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Heller's expectation that the purchased claims were secured and af-
fording Heller the same priority it would have if it had made future
advances directly to Bemporad appears quite proper.
2 5
B. Negotiable Liens
Proposals to curb abuses of inflatable liens while preserving le-
gitimate transactions must also deal with other arrangements
designed to convert unsecured debt into secured obligations under
an existing security interest. Consider the following situation ("Hy-
pothetical B"): On January 1, 1978, Debtor and Financier execute a
security agreement covering Debtor's equipment. The secured obli-
gations include "all debts now existing or hereafter arising owing by
Debtor to Financier or to any assignee of the security interest pro-
vided for herein." Financier lends Debtor $50,000, approximately
80% of the value of Debtor's equipment, and perfects its security
interest by filing. By September 1, 1980, Debtor has reduced Finan-
cier's claim to $5,000, but Debtor has become insolvent. Further-
more, Debtor has granted a junior security interest in the collateral
to another creditor and a judgment holder has levied on the equip-
ment. Debtor owes Manufacturer $45,000 on open account. On Oc-
tober 31, 1980, Financier assigns its security interest and its
remaining claim against Debtor to Manufacturer in exchange for
$10,000 in cash. On December 5, 1980, Debtor files a bankruptcy
petition. The equipment is sold for $50,000 and Manufacturer
claims the assigned security interest gives it priority in all proceeds.
According to the dragnet clause in Financier's security agree-
ment, the security interest covers pre-existing debts owed to an as-
signee of the security interest. Such a security interest might be
called a "negotiable lien." As Hypothetical B illustrates, negotiable
liens are subject to abuses similar to those possible with inflatable
liens. Financier's attempt to exploit its excess collateral value resem-
Bank, 62 Tenn. App. 560,465 S.W.2d 877 (1970); Second Nat'l Bank v. Boyle, 155 Ohio
St. 482, 99 N.E.2d 474 (1951).
25 Transactions in which assigned debt does not arise from value given in reliance
on the security interest can also be legitimate. Consider the following: Debtor guaran-
tees obligations of its subsidiary. Debtor gives the obligee a security interest to secure
that guarantee and all other "guarantee obligations." Before this arrangement was con-
templated, Debtor had guaranteed other obligations its subsidiary owed to a subsidiary
of the obligee. When Debtor executes the security agreement covering the later guaran-
tee, it understands that the security interest will secure the earlier guarantee if the guar-
anteed obligation is assigned to the secured party. Suppose the secured party takes such
an assignment and both Debtor and its subsidiary default. Debtor has in effect agreed
that the earlier guarantee would be secured. The secured party's reasonable expecta-
tion that the earlier guarantee is secured by the security interest deserves protection,
even though the secured party's subsidiary did not rely on the security interest when
extending the credit covered by the earlier guarantee.
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bles Lender's attempt in Hypothetical A to exploit its oversecured
position and similarly offends bankruptcy principles. For example,
if Manufacturer took a new security interest to secure its $45,000
claim, the transaction would run afoul of preference law. Moreover,
the legal issues raised by negotiable liens-the enforceability of the
arrangement, the priority rules applicable to claims held by the as-
signee of the security interest, and the applicability of the bank-
ruptcy trustee's avoiding powers-parallel those raised by inflatable
liens, and the resolution of these issues under current law is just as
difficult.
Negotiable liens, like inflatable liens, can also be used in per-
fectly legitimate transactions. An entity not party to a security
agreement may be willing to lend funds to a debtor only if it enjoys
the priority of another's security interest. If it is impractical to delay
the loan until after assignment of the security interest, the parties
could accomplish the transaction indirectly: the third party could
take a security interest in the rights of the secured party against the
debtor, then funnel the loan through the secured party to the
debtor. Using a negotiable lien in such a situation merely eliminates
the costs of taking and perfecting an extra security interest and po-
licing the original secured party's distribution of loan proceeds.
C. Other Variants
The transaction in In re Wilco Forest Machinery, Inc. 26 illustrates
yet another variation on conversion arrangements. The Eaton Cor-
poration 27 provided financing to the debtor. Obligations arising
from the financing arrangement were allocated to two accounts: (1)
"current accounts payable," representing inventory Eaton sold
debtor on open account, and (2) "debenture notes payable," se-
cured by a duly perfected security interest in all debtor's inventory,
accounts receivable, and bank accounts. The financing agreements
required debtor to transfer all current accounts not paid at the end
of a month to the debenture notes account and to issue correspond-
ing debentures to Eaton. Eaton did not strictly enforce this require-
ment until debtor developed a severe cash shortage,28 whereupon
Eaton forced debtor to transfer $617,630 from the current to the
debenture account and to issue corresponding debentures. 29 Less
26 491 F.2d 1041 (5th Cir. 1974).
27 The case also involved several subsidiaries of Eaton Corporation. I refer to the
parent and subsidiaries collectively as "Eaton."
28 The court held that Eaton should have known debtor was insolvent 10 months
before this development. 491 F.2d at 1044.
29 The procedure was as follows: Eaton held $900,000 in debentures, which were
convertible into common stock of debtor at Eaton's option. Eaton converted sufficient
debentures to gain majority control of debtor, then replaced all but one of debtor's
704 [Vol. 72:696
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than three months later, debtor filed for bankruptcy under the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898.30 The Fifth Circuit held that Eaton's secur-
ity interest covered the claims transferred to the debenture account
and upheld the transfer against the trustee's argument that it gave
rise to a preference voidable under the 1898 Act.3 1
The security agreement in Wilco permitted Eaton to convert
previously unsecured obligations into secured claims, just as un-
secured debt is converted in Hypotheticals A and B. 32 In Wilco,
however, there is little doubt that the debtor understood and as-
sented to the conversion feature of the arrangement, and Eaton
probably relied on its power to convert when it agreed to ship goods
to Wilco on credit. The arrangement, however, obscured the fact
that the secured obligations included not just the debenture notes
account but also, in practical effect, Eaton's open account claims.
This could easily have misled third parties who extended credit to
Wilco on the strength of the debtor's apparent equity in the collat-
eral. Indeed, the odd structure of the financing arrangement may
reflect a deliberate attempt to make it appear that Wilco retained
substantial unencumbered assets. Given Eaton's power to transfer
the large amount of overdue open account indebtedness into the
secured debenture notes account, however, no unencumbered as-
sets actually existed.33
directors with its own representatives. The new Board raised the limit on debtor's de-
benture indebtedness, transferred the current account into the debenture account, and
issued new debentures. Id. at 1044. The control Eaton exercised via the convertible
debentures probably would make Eaton an "insider" of debtor under the Bankruptcy
Code. 11 U.S.C. § 101(28)(B)(iii) (Supp. III 1985). Thus, under the current Bankruptcy
Code's preference provision, Eaton would be subject to a one year preference period.
11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(B) (Supp. III 1985).
30 Bankruptcy Act of 1898, Ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898) (repealed 1978).
31 491 F.2d at 1045-47. Approximately one month after the conversion of current
accounts into debenture accounts, Eaton foreclosed on the collateral covered by its se-
curity interest, which comprised almost all debtor's assets. The trustee sought to re-
cover the assets seized to satisfy the converted current accounts on the basis of the
preference provision in the 1898 Act, but the Fifth Circuit rejected the argument. Most
of the opinion discusses whether Eaton's financing statement was sufficient and whether
the Board of Directors appointed by Eaton, see supra note 29, had the power to raise
debtor's ceiling on debentures. 491 F.2d at 1045-46. It is not clear whether the court
understood the issues raised by the conversion of the current accounts. In any event,
citing In re King-Porter Co., 446 F.2d 722 (5th Cir. 1971) (discussed infra text accompany-
ing notes 166-74), the court held that the lien securing the converted accounts was
transferred for preference purposes when Eaton perfected by filing-a date well outside
the preference period. 491 F.2d at 1046-47.
32 Unlike the secured claimant in Hypothetical A, however, Eaton presumably paid
full value for its claims by shipping goods on credit to the debtor.
33 Wilco illustrates that parties can use conversion arrangements to disguise the ex-
tent to which assets are encumbered even if the convertible obligations are the func-
tional equivalent of future advances, that is, even if they represent new value given in
reliance on the security interest. In Wilco the sale of inventory to the debtor on credit
(which gave rise to the unsecured open account indebtedness) represented new value
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Although article 9 relies primarily on filing to provide third par-
ties with information, financing statements need reveal nothing
about the amount or nature of the secured obligations. 34 U.C.C.
section 9-208 creates a procedure by which third parties can, with
the debtor's cooperation, obtain from a secured party a statement of
the outstanding indebtedness secured by collateral.3 5 Section 9-
208, however, requires only that the secured party approve or cor-
rect a statement of "the aggregate amount of unpaid indebtedness
as of a specified date." 36 Assuming that this phrase refers only to
secured indebtedness, section 9-208 would probably not have re-
quired Eaton to reveal that it could convert Wilco's existing obliga-
tions into secured debt.
Fraudulent transfer law, which permits avoidance of transac-
tions accomplished with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud
creditors, and principles of equitable estoppel may be sufficient to
handle the abuse of conversion arrangements illustrated by Wilco.
3 7
Given that third parties cannot reasonably rely on a section 9-208
statement of indebtedness because the debtor's equity in the collat-
eral may disappear if the secured party makes future advances,3 8
section 9-208 may not be the appropriate vehicle to address this
abuse. Nevertheless, section 9-208 establishes a procedure for ob-
taining reliable information pertaining to the debtor's equity in col-
lateral, subject to the possibility that future advances will consume
that equity. Such future advances, unlike credit already extended
and later converted into secured indebtedness, enhance the debtor's
assets available to other creditors. 39 It would therefore make sense
to interpret or amend section 9-208 to require secured parties to
and may very well have been made in reliance on the power to transfer overdue obliga-
tions into the secured account.
34 U.C.C. § 9-402(1) provides:
A financing statement is sufficient if it gives the names of the debtor
and the secured party, is signed by the debtor, gives an address of the
secured party from which information concerning the security interest
may be obtained, gives a mailing address of the debtor and contains a
statement indicating the types, or describing the items, of collateral.
U.C.C. § 9-402(1) (1977).
35 Id. § 9-208 (1977).
36 Id. § 9-208(1) (1977).
37 See IA P. COOGAN, W. HOGAN, D. VAGTS & J. McDONNELL, SECURED TRANSAC-
TIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 6C.07(3)(b), at 6C-115 to 18 (1985)
[hereinafter SECURED TRANSACTIONS].
38 See infra Parts III & IV (discussing priority of future advances). The minimal
protection afforded by a § 9-208 statement of indebtedness combined with the unwieldy
procedure for obtaining it may explain why the provision remains ambiguous. See IA
SECURED TRANSACTIONS, supra note 37, § 6C.07(3)(b), at 6C-1 13 to 23; Justice, supra
note 1, at 883-86.
39 Cf infra text accompanying note 121 (discussing Professor Gilmore's compensa-
tion rationale for the priority of future advances).
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reveal existing unsecured indebtedness that can be converted into
secured obligations under a security interest. Failure to make this
disclosure should prevent the secured party from claiming priority
over a relying creditor with respect to the unreported obligations.
To appreciate the scope of potential problems with conversion
arrangements, consider a final illustration ("Hypothetical C"): Sup-
pose the security agreement in Hypothetical A did not cover obliga-
tions Lender acquired by assignment. After Creditor assigns its
claim to Lender but before Debtor files for bankruptcy, Debtor and
Lender amend their security agreement to cover the assigned obli-
gation. Nothing in Article 9 addresses the effect of adding to the
secured obligations by amending the security agreement. If the
amendment is enforceable Lender can easily argue that its priority
over competing claimants relates back to the time it filed a financing
statement. If successful, this argument would prevent Debtor's
bankruptcy trustee from using preference law to foil Lender's ma-
neuver.40 In short, the abuse illustrated by Hypothetical A can oc-
cur whenever an oversecured creditor has enough leverage to
induce a financially battered debtor to amend a security agreement.
II
ENFORCEABILITY OF CONVERSION ARRANGEMENTS
A. Early Dragnet Clause Cases
Whether inflatable liens and other conversion devices are en-
forceable under current law is a question intimately connected with
judicial decisions dealing with the dragnet clauses typically found in
security agreements creating such arrangements. 41 Long before Ar-
40 See infra Part V(A) (discussing application of preference law to converted
indebtedness).
41 Although the dragnet clause in Hypothetical A specifically covers debt acquired
by assignment, that will not always be the case. See, e.g., Berger v. Fuller, 180 Ark. 372,
373, 21 S.W.2d 419, 420 (1929) (dragnet clause covering" 'any indebtedness of whatso-
ever sort or nature that may be due from mortgagors to mortgagee at the time of fore-
closing this mortgage' "). Compare the following form dragnet clause: "This mortgage
is given to secure the payment of a promissory note (describe in detail), and also the
payment of any additional sums and interest thereon now or hereafter due or owing
from mortgagor to mortgagee." G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE
FINANCE LAW 772 (1979) [hereinafter REAL ESTATE FINANCE]. The wording of some
dragnet clauses appears to exclude assigned debt. See, e.g., Cotton v. First Nat'l Bank,
228 Ala. 311, 314, 153 So. 225, 228 (1934) (clause covering "'any additional amounts
furnished me [mortgagor] by the mortgagee on any account and at any time before the debt
herein is fully paid, in money or otherwise'" (emphasis added by court)).
Many cases dealing with dragnet clauses in real estate mortgages, including several
involving inflatable liens, are discussed in Annotation, Debts Included in Provision of Mort-
gage Purporting to Cover Unspecified Future or Existing Debts ("Dragnet" Clause), 172 A.L.R.
1079 (1948) [hereinafter Annotation, Debts] and Annotation, Debts Included in Provision of
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ticle 9 was proposed, dragnet clauses42 had provoked judicial hostil-
ity. The typical dispute arose when a mortgagor defaulted on some
original obligation to the mortgagee which was unrelated to the
loan or credit that occasioned the mortgage (the "primary obliga-
tion").43 When the mortgagee attempted to foreclose on the basis
of a broad dragnet clause, the mortgagor would argue that he never
intended to give security for the defaulted obligation.
In most cases, the mortgagor probably did not understand the
potential reach of the security agreement. The dragnet clause most
likely was boilerplate appearing on a printed form agreement or
copied from a form book, and was probably included without dis-
cussion by the parties.44 One court labelled mortgages containing
dragnet clauses " '[a]naconda mortgages' . . . as by their broad and
general terms they enwrap the unsuspecting debtor in the folds of
indebtedness embraced and secured in the mortgage which he did
not contemplate." 45 Seeking to avoid harsh results, a number of
courts adopted a policy of construing dragnet clauses strictly against
the mortgagee. Several adopted the following formula:
The "other indebtedness" secured by a mortgage may be either
antecedent or subsequent. Where it is antecedent, it must be
identified in clear terms, and where it is subsequent, it must be of
the same class as the primary obligation secured by the instru-
ment and so related to it that the consent of the debtor to its in-
clusion may be inferred. 46
Mortgage Purporting to Cover All Future and Existing Debts (Dragnet Clause)-Modern Status, 3
A.L.R.4th 690 (1981).
42 For other discussions ofjudicial treatment of dragnet clauses, see 2 G. GILMORE,
supra note 3, § 35.5, at 932-33; Justice, supra note 1, at 903-15; Note, Future Advances
Financing Under the Uniform Commercial Code: Curbing the Abuses of the Dragnet Clause, 34 U.
Prrr. L. REV. 691, 692-93 (1973).
43 For example, in Beavers v. LeSueur, 188 Ga. 393, 3 S.E.2d 667 (1939), plaintiff
attempted to foreclose on a security deed given by defendant (a lawyer) to secure a note
for $1,650 and "any and all other indebtedness which the grantor herein may now owe,
or may hereafter owe to grantee." Id. at 402, 3 S.E.2d at 673. Plaintiff sought to satisfy
not only the $1,650 note but also a claim for $1,882.35 based on defendant's negligent
representation of plaintiff in unrelated litigation. The court held that the security deed
did not cover the malpractice claim. Id. at 403-04, 3 S.E.2d at 674.
44 REAL ESTATE FINANCE, supra note 41, at 772.
45 Berger v. Fuller, 180 Ark. 372, 377, 21 S.W.2d 419, 421 (1929).
46 National Bank v. Blankenship, 177 F. Supp. 667, 673 (E.D. Ark. 1959) (applying
Arkansas law), aff'd sub nom. National Bank v. General Mills, Inc., 283 F.2d 574 (8th Cir.
1960). Courts viewed the formula as a rule of construction purportedly aiding discovery
of the parties' intent. See, e.g., id. at 672-73; John Miller Supply Co. v. Western State
Bank, 55 Wis. 2d 385, 392-94, 199 N.W.2d 161, 164-65 (1972); Capocasa v. First Nat'l
Bank, 36 Wis. 2d 714, 719-25, 154 N.W.2d 271, 274-77 (1967). The formula is phrased,
however, as a substantive rule containing positive requirements-antecedent indebted-
ness must be identified in clear terms, subsequent indebtedness "must be of the same
class . . .and so related." National Bank v. Blankenship, 177 F. Supp. 667, 673 (E.D.
Ark. 1959), aff'd sub. nom. National Bank v. General Mills, Inc., 283 F.2d 574 (8th Cir.
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When disputes involving inflatable liens arose, many courts
adopted a similar approach. In Poulter v. Weatherford Hardware Co.,47
for instance, Poulter gave Weatherford a chattel mortgage to secure
seven specified promissory notes and "any other amount I may now
owe, or hereafter owe, as if the same were specifically described
herein." 48 Weatherford later purchased a third party's judgment
against Poulter and attempted to foreclose the chattel mortgage to
satisfy the judgment. The Texas appeals court held that the judg-
ment was not secured, stating that the reach of dragnet clauses is
confined to "debts of the general kind of that specifically
secured."
49
Even jurisdictions that took a strict approach to construing
dragnet clauses, however, sometimes held that claims assigned to
the secured party were covered by a sufficiently broad provision. In
Lamoille County Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Belden,50 for instance, the
Vermont Supreme Court held that a defeasance clause covering "all
further sums we or either of us [the mortgagors] now owe it [the
mortgagee] or may become owing it in any way" secured a mortga-
gor's note assigned to the mortgagee after the mortgage was exe-
cuted.5 1 Seventeen years later, in Strong Hardware Co. v. Gonyow,52
the same court held that a mortgage containing a dragnet clause
covering "all other indebtedness of [mortgagors] to the said mort-
gagees, their heirs and assigns, heretofore or hereafter contracted,
and represented by promissory notes or otherwise" did not cover a
note that the mortgagee's assignee acquired by assignment.53 The
court did not overrule Lamoille, but distinguished it based on differ-
ences in the dragnet clauses' language and because the mortgagee
1960). In any event, it was often applied without genuine inquiry into the parties' intent.
Justice, supra note 1, at 897-98, 905; see Note, supra note 42, at 696-97.
47 166 S.W. 364 (rex. Ct. App. 1914).
48 Id. at 364.
49 Id. Other pre-Article 9 cases held that a consensual lien on real property did not
cover obligations obtained by assignment after the lien arose. Crutchfield v. Johnson &
Latimer, 243 Ala. 73, 8 So. 2d 412 (1942); Berger v. Fuller, 180 Ark. 372, 21 S.W.2d 419
(1929); Lightle v. Rotenberry, 166 Ark. 337, 266 S.W. 297 (1924); Walker v. Whitmore,
165 Ark. 276, 262 S.W. 678 (1924); Martin v. Holbrooks, 55 Ark. 569, 18 S.W. 1046
(1892); Provident Mut. Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Shaffer, 2 Cal. App. 216, 83 P. 274 (1905);
First Nat'l Bank v. Combs, 208 Ky. 763, 271 S.W. 1077 (1925); Lashbrooks v. Hatheway,
52 Mich. 124, 17 N.W. 723 (1883). Recent cases are in accord. Thorp Sales Corp. v.
Dolese Bros., 453 F. Supp. 196 (W.D. Okla. 1978) (personal property); Exparte Chan-
dler, 477 So. 2d 360 (Ala. 1985) (real property); Pongetti v. Banker's Trust Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 368 So. 2d 819 (Miss. 1979) (real property); Hudson v. Bank of Leakesville, 249
So. 2d 371 (Miss. 1971) (real property); Wood v. Parker Square State Bank, 400 S.W.2d
898 (Tex. 1966) (real property).
50 90 Vt. 535, 98 A. 1002 (1916).
51 Id. at 537, 98 A. at 1003-04.
52 105 Vt. 415, 168 A. 547 (1933).
53 Id. at 417, 168 A. at 547.
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in the earlier case acquired the note in the normal course of busi-
ness.5 4 The Gonyow court felt itself free to "adopt the law" of cases
in other jurisdictions hostile to conversion arrangements. 55
At least one jurisdiction rejected the strict construction princi-
ple. In Rose City Foods, Inc. v. Bank of Thomas County,56 the Supreme
Court of Georgia held that open account indebtedness assigned to a
bank was secured by bills of sale for motor vehicles that the account
debtor executed before the assignment. Each bill of sale recited
that it secured a specific loan by the bank and "any and all other
indebtedness now due by me [debtor] to said bank or hereafter in-
curred by me, whether directly or indirectly, as principal, endorser,
guarantor, or otherwise." 57 The court noted that "it is a well estab-
lished principle of law in this State that a grantor may convey prop-
erty, real or personal, for the purpose of securing a present, past, or
future indebtedness."58 The language of the bills of sale, which the
court construed to reach assigned obligations, was a "matter of pri-
vate contract" which "courts should always guard with jealous care"
and "give... full effect when it is possible to do so." 59 As a result of
Rose City and similar cases, 60 the Georgia legislature amended the
state mortgage statute to restrict the reach of dragnet clauses to
"debts or obligations arising.., between the original parties to the
security instrument." 6 1
A few cases involving what this article labels negotiable liens
have also appeared. In most instances, courts relied on the dragnet
clause doctrines explored above and construed mortgages not to
reach claims held by an assignee of the mortgage if the claims pre-
dated the assignment.
62
54 Id. at 418, 168 A. at 548.
55 Id. at 419, 168 A. at 548.
56 207 Ga. 477, 62 S.E.2d 145 (1950).
57 Id. at 478, 62 S.E.2d at 146.
58 Id. at 481, 62 S.E.2d at 148.
59 Id. For other cases holding that a consensual lien covered obligations obtained
by assignment after the lien arose, see Nix v. Hopper, 18 Ala. App. 240, 90 So. 35 (1921)
(personal property); Collins v. Gregg, 109 Iowa 506, 80 N.W. 562 (1899) (real and per-
sonal property); First Nat'l Bank v. Byard, 26 N.J. Eq. 255 (1875) (real property); La-
moille County Sav. Bank & Trust Co. v. Belden, 90 Vt. 535, 98 A. 1002 (1916) (real
property).
60 E.g., Vidalia Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Durrence, 94 Ga. App. 368, 94 S.E.2d 609
(1956) (deed covering all liability to grantee and assigns secured judgment against gran-
tor obtained by third party who later took assignment of deed and thereby gained prior-
ity over junior mortgagee whose interest arose before judgment or assignment).
61 GA. CODE ANN. § 44-14-1(b) (1981). In Poole v. Smith, 226 Ga. 259, 174 S.E.2d
430 (1970), the Georiga Supreme Court held that the statute did not apply to a security
deed executed before the law became effective.
62 Berger v. Fuller, 180 Ark. 372, 21 S.W.2d 419 (1929) (claims held by assignee of
mortgage at time of assignment were not secured by mortgage); Americus Finance Co.
v. Wilson, 189 Ga. 635, 7 S.E.2d 259 (1939) (security deed covering all indebtedness
710 [Vol. 72:696
AFTER-SECURED OBLIGATIONS
B. Dragnet Clause Cases Following the Adoption of Article 9
The extent to which the principles of early dragnet clause cases
survive under Article 9 is in dispute. Professor Gilmore, one of the
drafters of Article 9, cited with approval cases that refused to apply
dragnet clauses to debt unrelated "to the financing transaction
which the mortgage was given to secure." 6 Some courts have fol-
lowed Gilmore's lead and required a showing of "relatedness" be-
tween the primary obligation and the debt in question;64 other
courts have not.65 The only Article 9 provision that addresses what
obligations may be secured is section 9-204(3), which validates cov-
erage of "future advances or other value."' 66 The only limitation
expressed in the Code is that the obligation must be "covered by a
owing to grantee or assigns by joint grantors did not cover note given by one grantor to
third party who obtained security deed by assignment); Moss v. Hipp, 387 S.W.2d 656
(Tex. 1965) (chattel mortgage, purporting to secure indebtedness owing to holder of
mortgage, did not secure claim of third party who obtained assignment of chattel mort-
gage). Contra Vidalia Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Durrence, 94 Ga. App. 368, 94 S.E.2d 609
(1956) (security deed covering all liability to grantee and assigns secured judgment
against grantor obtained by third party who later took assignment of deed and thereby
gained priority over junior mortgagee whose interest arose before judgment or
assignment).
63 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 3, § 35.2, at 917-18. Professor Gilmore specifically
addressed inflatable and negotiable lien situations. Id. § 35.2, at 918. He quoted with
approval the formulation set out at supra text accompanying note 46. Id. § 35.2, at 920-
21.
64 Marine Nat'l Bank v. Airco, Inc., 389 F. Supp. 231 (W.D. Pa. 1975); In re Midas
Coin Co., 264 F. Supp. 193 (E.D. Mo. 1967), aff'd sub. nom. Zuke v. St. John's Commu-
nity Bank, 387 F.2d 118 (8th Cir. 1968); Community Bank v. Jones, 278 Or. 647, 566
P.2d 470 (1977); John Miller Supply Co. v. Western State Bank, 55 Wis. 2d 385, 199
N.W.2d 161 (1972). See Justice, supra note 1, at 906-11.
65 Kimbell Foods, Inc. v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 557 F.2d 491 (5th Cir. 1977), aff'd
sub nom. United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979); In re Public Leasing
Corp., 488 F.2d 1369 (10th Cir. 1973); In re Riss Tanning Corp., 468 F.2d 1211 (2d Cir.
1972); Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Community Banking Co., 35 Conn. Supp. 73, 395 A.2d
727 (Super. Ct. 1978); South County Sand & Gravel Co. v. Bituminous Pavers Co., 106
R.I. 178, 256 A.2d 514 (1969). SeeJustice, supra note 1, at 906-11; see also Labovitz, The
Future of the Future Advancements Clause, 66J. COM. BANK LENDING 37 (1983). For recent
discussions of the tests for determining whether after-secured obligations (in these
cases, future advances) are covered by a security agreement, see In re Continental Re-
sources Corp., 43 Bankr. 658, 661-63 (W.D. Ok. 1984) (real property mortgage), aff'd,
799 F.2d 622 (10th Cir. 1986); In re Bates, 35 Bankr. 475, 477-79 (M.D. Tenn. 1983)
(Article 9 security interest).
66 U.C.C. § 9-204(3) (1977). Nothing in the U.C.C. prohibits negotiable liens. In-
deed, Article 9 clearly contemplates that security interests can be assigned. See U.C.C.
§ 9-302(2) (1977) ("If a secured party assigns a perfected security interest, no filing
under this Article is required in order to continue the perfected status of the security
interest against creditors of and transferees from the original debtor."); U.C.C. § 9-
405(2) (1977) (secured party who assigns its security interest has option to file notice of
assignment, although such notice is not required); see also B. CLARK, THE LAW OF SE-
CURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 2.16, at 2-77 to -78
(1980). No Article 9 provision, however, addresses what obligations may be covered by
a security interest that has been assigned.
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security agreement." 67
The general policy of Article 9 is that "[e]xcept for procedure
on default, freedom of contract prevails between the immediate par-
ties to the security transaction." 68 Thus, the doctrines of pre-Article
9 cases may indeed survive to the extent that the pre-Article 9 doc-
trines clarify the parties' intent. To the extent they contain limita-
tions on the parties' freedom to contract not explicitly adopted in
Article 9, however, pre-Article 9 principles do not survive. 69 Under
this approach, an Article 9 security agreement can cover any after-
secured obligations the parties intend.
A clause in a security agreement that could be construed to
cover assigned debt or obligations owed to an assignee of the secur-
ity interest, however, should not be sufficient to establish an inflat-
able or negotiable lien. If part of a form agreement or inserted
without meaningful discussion, the clause says little about the par-
ties' actual intent. Given the exotic nature of inflatable and negotia-
ble liens, courts should require specific indications that the parties
meant to create such an arrangement.
Even such evidence would not necessarily mean that the parties
intended to secure all obligations obtained by assignment or debts
owed to an assignee of the security interest. For instance, a debtor
who assented to an inflatable lien may not have contemplated the
possibility that the creditor would acquire claims after the primary
obligation was repaid. 70 Construing the security agreement to cover
such claims would subject the debtor to substantial hardship. A se-
cured party could prevent debtor from clearing title to collateral
under U.C.C. section 9-404(1) 71 simply by purchasing debt from
67 U.C.C. § 9-204(3) (1977); see id. comment 5.
68 U.C.C. § 9-101 comment (1977); see U.C.C. § 9-201 (1977) ("Except as otherwise
provided by this Act a security agreement is effective according to its terms between the
parties .... ).
69 See Justice, supra note 1, at 904. As an absolute prohibition on coverage of "an-
tecedent" debts not specifically mentioned in the security agreement and "subsequent"
debts not "of the same class as the primary obligation," the formula quoted at supra text
accompanying note 46 should be rejected. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how the
"same class" requirement would apply to debt acquired by assignment. If both the pri-
mary obligation and the assigned debt arose from loans to the debtor, does not the
assigned claim satisfy this requirement? What if the assigned debt arose from a loan
given under a different security interest? What if the primary obligation itself was origi-
nally unsecured and had been obtained by assignment before the security agreement
was executed?
On the other hand, the formula highlights factors relevant in determining the
proper scope of a dragnet clause. Used in this fashion-as a genuine rule of construction
to resolve ambiguities-the formula has some value.
70 Dragnet clause cases not involving assigned debt suggest this possibility. See
cases collected in Annotation, Debts, supra note 41, at 1088-91.
71 U.C.C. § 9-404(1) (1977) (procedure for noting discharge of secured obligations
and termination of financing arrangements).
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third parties. In other situations, however, the arrangement be-
tween the parties may require that the security agreement reach
claims acquired after satisfaction of the primary debt.
Judges must approach agreements that appear to create inflat-
able or negotiable liens realistically. A court cannot find the parties'
intent as to situations they did not anticipate. It can only determine
what the parties would have done had they foreseen the situation
that developed. In this respect, security agreements involving inflat-
able or negotiable liens are no different from other contracts. As a
general guide, a court should find that a particular debt is secured
when such a finding is consistent with the legitimate purposes of the
security agreement as contemplated by the parties at the time they
executed the agreement. 72 The doctrine of unconscionability em-
bodies this approach, and commentators have urged its application
to inflatable liens.
73
Enforcing inflatable or negotiable liens only where the debtor
and secured party have actually agreed to such an arrangement will
protect the parties to a security agreement. Conversion arrange-
ments, however, can also have an enormous impact on the rights of
the debtor's other creditors. The effect on third party creditors ex-
ists whether or not the debtor and secured party understood and
agreed to the conversion feature. Debtor's knowing assent to the
inflatable lien in Hypothetical A, for instance, would not improve
the outlook for Bank, Tortvictim, or Debtor's other creditors, nor
would it justify protecting Lender at their expense. The priority
rules in Article 9, in combination with the Bankruptcy Code's avoid-
ance provisions, are designed to protect third parties against abuse
of security interests. It is to the Article 9 priority rules, therefore,
that the discussion must turn.
III
PRIORITY UNDER ARTICLE 9: CONVERTED CLAIMS AND
CONFLICTING SECURITY INTERESTS
A. Priority Under the 1962 Version of U.C.C. Section 9-312
The priority rules in U.C.C. Article 9 appear to assume that af-
ter-secured obligations will represent credit extended in reliance on
a security interest. The drafters of Article 9 did not anticipate the
phenomenon of non-reliance after-secured indebtedness. This fail-
ure makes it difficult to reach sensible results in priority contests
72 Cf Note, supra note 42, at 696-98 (suggesting similar test for determining scope
of dragnet clauses).
73 Justice, supra note I, at 905-06; see 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 3, § 35.2 at 919-20.
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between security interests with a conversion feature and junior in-
terests in the same collateral.
To illustrate, return to Hypothetical A and consider the results
of a priority contest between Lender and Bank under the 1962 ver-
sion of Article 9. Assuming Debtor in fact assented to Lender's in-
flatable lien, Lender clearly prevails over Bank. Questions of
priority between conflicting security interests in the same collateral
are governed by section 9-312. Because none of the rules stated in
the 1962 version of section 9-312(1) through (4) apply to this situa-
tion, the "residuary" rule in section 9-312(5) governs. Section 9-
312(5) (a) gives priority to the first secured party to file or perfect.
74
Because Lender and Bank perfected by filing, Lender wins as to
both the original and the acquired claims because it filed first.
The Fifth Circuit missed an opportunity to explore this issue in
In re E.A. Fretz Co.,75 a dispute arising under the 1898 Bankruptcy
Act. Revlon took a security interest in Fretz's equipment and inven-
tory. The security agreements purported to reach debts acquired
"by assignment or otherwise."' 76 After Revlon perfected by filing,
Republic National Bank took a security interest in Fretz's inventory
and perfected by filing. Approximately one year later, Fretz filed for
bankruptcy. At that time, Fretz had outstanding obligations to both
Revlon and Republic secured by their respective security interests.
Fretz was also indebted to two Revlon subsidiaries. Shortly after
Fretz's bankruptcy petition, the two subsidiaries assigned their
claims to Revlon. 77 The bankruptcy judge decided that Revlon's se-
curity interest, which was senior to Republic's lien, secured the as-
signed claims, leaving no collateral for Republic. 78 The district
court affirmed.
79
74 The 1962 version of § 9-312(5) provides:
In all cases not governed by other rules stated in this section ....
priority between conflicting security interests in the same collateral shall
be determined as follows:
(a) in the order of filing if both are perfected by filing, regardless of
which security interest attached first under Section 9-204(1) and
whether it attached before or after filing ....
U.C.C. § 9-312 (1962).
75 565 F.2d 366 (5th Cir. 1978) (applying Texas law); see also Justice, supra note 1
(discussing case at length).
76 565 F.2d at 368 n.2.
77 Id. See infra note 147 for observations on whether the post-petition conversion of
unsecured claims into secured obligations violates the automatic stay provided for in
§ 362 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1982).
78 The inventory was sold for approximately $106,000. At the time of the petition,
Fretz owed Revlon and a more senior lien holder (whose claim was thereafter assigned
to Revlon) approximately $31,000. The claims assigned to Revlon by its subsidiaries





The Fifth Circuit reversed in a haze of confusion over "the bi-
zarre facts of this case."80 Most of the opinion discusses whether a
financing statement filed under Revlon's name could perfect a se-
curity interest in favor of its subsidiaries. The subsidiaries, however,
did not claim a security interest. Indeed, they did not even assert
the assigned claims in the bankruptcy proceedings because Revlon
had taken over the claims. The court clearly misperceived the issue
and, consequently, the applicable law.'
When the court of appeals tried to address the argument that
Revlon itself had a security interest that covered claims assigned to
it, its opinion degenerated into mere invective.
Neither the Bankruptcy Judge nor Revlon has explained to our
satisfaction precisely how (by abracadabra, sleight of hand, bap-
tism or otherwise?) this perfected secured status arose. Mystical,
magical miracles are rare, even in Texas. The naked conclusion
that the indebtedness of the Revlon subs was secured by their par-
ent's security interest does not hold water; it simply avoids the
real question of how the transmutation could have occurred
within the terms of the UCC.
8 2
The court noted "the potential for inequality, and, indeed collusion
or fraud" (which it labelled "enormous") under these circum-
stances.83 It quoted a passage from Collier on Bankruptcy that de-
scribed the bankruptcy policy favoring equality in distributing a
debtor's assets.8 4 Finally, the court held that Revlon's security inter-
est did not cover the assigned claims and that Republic had priority
after Revlon's senior claims-which did not include those assigned
by its subsidiaries-were satisfied.8 5
What permitted the magical transformation that so mystified
the court, of course, was Revlon's inflatable lien. Once that is recog-
nized,8 6 the case becomes a simple priority contest between Repub-
80 Id. at 367.
81 The opinion also threatened to confuse the law governing security interests per-
fected in the name of an agent or trustee representing others with claims against the
debtor. Justice, supra note 1, at 872-96. Cf B. CLARK, supra note 66, 2.9[2], at 2-37 to
38.
82 565 F.2d at 374 n.23.
83 Id. at 374.
84 Id. at 374-75 (quoting 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 60.01, at 743 (14th ed.
1977)).
85 Id. at 375.
86 Fretz must have known that the security agreements with Revlon would cover
claims assigned by Revlon subsidiaries. The security agreements stated that they cov-
ered debtor's obligations to Revlon and present or future affiliates, as well as obligations
Revlon (or present or future affiliates) might obtain by assignment. Id. at 368 n.2; see B.
CLARK, supra note 66, 2.11[2], at 2-56 to 57. Thus, Revlon's inflatable lien would
probably pass muster under the principles described supra text accompanying notes 68-
73. The circumstances in which an Article 9 security interest can secure debts not due to
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lic and Revlon. Revlon arguably should have prevailed because,
under the 1962 version of Article 9,87 the first to file (Revlon) has
priority.88 Similarly, under the 1962 version of Article 9 the claims
converted from unsecured to secured status in Hypotheticals A, B,
and C would also arguably have priority from the time of filing over
conflicting security interests in the collateral.
B. Priority under the 1972 Version of U.C.C. Section 9-312
Determining the priority of a converted obligation as against an
intervening security interest is more complicated under the 1972
version of Article 9. The 1972 amendments added a provision spec-
ifying the priority of claims based on future advances where there
are conflicting security interests in collateral. New section 9-
312(7)89 provides that future advances made while a security inter-
est is perfected by filing or by possession of the collateral (or pursu-
ant to a commitment made "before or while the security interest is
so perfected" 90 ) have priority under the rules in section 9-312(5).91
Thus, under the 1972 version of Article 9, a future advance lender
has priority as to advances made while the security interest is per-
the secured party (for example, Revlon's subsidiaries' claims before they were assigned
to Revlon) is beyond the scope of this article.
87 The parties in Fretz agreed that the 1962 version of Article 9, which was in effect
at the time the security agreements in question were executed, governed the dispute.
565 F.2d at 368 & n.3.
88 See Justice, supra note 1, at 918. The Fifth Circuit's reference to the bankruptcy
policy favoring equality of distribution, 565 F.2d at 374, must be taken with a very large
grain of salt. The court did not hold that the general creditors should share the collat-
eral Revlon claimed; it held that the collateral should be used to satisfy the claim of a
single creditor-Republic. If Fretz's bankruptcy trustee could have avoided the lien se-
curing the claims assigned to Revlon under the 1898 Bankruptcy Act, Republic would
have had to prove its priority over the avoided lien to keep the assets from the general
creditors. Carlson & Shupack,Judicial Lien Priorities under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code: Part I, 5 CARDOZO L. REv. 287, 364 n.323 (1984). The same would be true under
the current Bankruptcy Code, which preserves avoided transfers "for the benefit of the
estate." 11 U.S.C. § 551 (1982).
The application of various bankruptcy avoidance provisions to inflatable liens is
explored infra Part V.
89 The 1972 version of § 9-312(7) provides:
If future advances are made while a security interest is perfected by filing
or the taking of possession, the security interest has the same priority for
the purposes of subsection (5) with respect to the future advances as it
does with respect to the first advance. If a commitment is made before or
while the security interest is so perfected, the security interest has the
same priority with respect to advances made pursuant thereto. In other
cases a perfected security interest has priority from the date the advance
is made.
U.C.C. § 9-312(7) (1972). The 1977 amendments added the phrase "or under Section
8-321 on securities" after "taking of possession" in the first sentence. Id. (1977).
90 Id. (1972).
91 Id. § 9-312(5) (1977).
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fected in the specified manner if he was the first to file or perfect. If
an advance is made while the security interest is not so perfected,
priority dates from the time the advance is made.92
The obvious question is whether converted obligations come
within the term "future advance." If converted claims are not
deemed future advances governed by section 9-312(7), the results
under the 1972 Code are the same as under the 1962 Code. The
1972 residuary rule in section 9-312(5) is indistinguishable from the
1962 version of section 9-312(5) for purposes of this discussion.
The 1972 version would give Lender priority over Bank in Hypo-
thetical A because Lender was the first to file.
If converted obligations are treated as future advances gov-
erned by section 9-312(7), the results are unclear. On facts like Hy-
pothetical A, for instance, when was the advance "made"? At the
time Creditor assigned its claim to Lender?93 At the time Creditor
made its unsecured loan? If the former, a literal application of sec-
tion 9-312(7) would give Lender priority because the assignment oc-
curred while Lender had a security interest perfected by filing and
Lender filed first. Under this interpretation, a senior inflatable lien
has priority over an intervening junior lien with respect to assigned
debts as long as the assignment occurred while the inflatable lien
was perfected as specified in the first sentence of section 9-312(7).
If the assignment had occurred when the inflatable lien was not so
perfected, Lender's priority would date from the time of assignment
under the last sentence of section 9-312(7). In that case, Lender
would be subordinate to Bank as to the assigned claim.
If the advance is deemed made when Creditor granted the un-
secured loan, the priority situation is even more curious. If Creditor
made the unsecured loan after Lender filed its financing statement,
Lender appears to have priority under the first sentence of section
9-312(7). If Creditor made the loan before Lender filed, the last
sentence of section 9-312(7) dates priority from "the date the ad-
vance is made" (that is, the date the unsecured loan was made).
Thus, Lender still appears to have priority. Indeed, in the last situa-
tion Lender arguably has priority even if Bank filed first, as long as
92 Id. § 9-312(7) (1972).
93 Although the term "future advance" is not defined in Article 9, a respectable
definition might be "value given after the security interest attaches." Taking a security
interest for an antecedent claim constitutes giving value. Id. § 1-201(44)(b) (1977).
Thus, Lender in Hypothetical A "gave value" when it acquired Creditor's claim. This
would be true even if the assignment had been gratuitous. Because Lender gave this
value after the security interest attached, it could be considered a "future advance."
Similarly, the secured parties in Hypotheticals B and C gave value and hence arguably
made future advances when they converted previously unsecured claims into secured
indebtedness.
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Creditor made its loan before Bank filed.
94
1. Future Advance Rules and Reliance Obligations
Does it make sense to give Lender priority over Bank? In cer-
tain circumstances, the 1972 version of section 9-312 grants retroac-
tive priority for future advances representing new value given by a
secured party. Such priority, of course, may "squeeze out" ajunior
party; that is, later advances by the senior party may consume the
debtor's equity in the collateral. If the senior interest is perfected
by the methods mentioned in the first sentence of section 9-312(7),
however, a junior party is on notice of this risk.95 The junior party
will either eliminate the risk (for example, by obtaining a subordina-
tion agreement or by paying off the senior party and terminating his
priority) or adjust the terms of his credit to compensate for it.96
Retroactive priority for advances made by senior interest holders
thus imposes costs on lending by junior parties, but these costs are
presumably more than offset by a reduction in transaction costs ac-
companying senior party lending.97 The rationale for the priority
afforded future advances, therefore, is that it reduces the costs asso-
ciated with secured lending.
98
If assigned claims or other converted obligations represent
credit extended in reliance on the security interest (for example, the
obligations assigned in Heller99), and if the security interest was per-
fected by the methods listed in the first sentence of section 9-312(7)
when the credit was extended, the converted obligations deserve the
94 This result reflects a more general problem in the drafting of § 9-312(7). Unless
the priority rule in the last sentence of § 9-312(7) is limited to advances made after a
financing statement has been filed or the security interest has been perfected in some
manner (a qualification that the subsection does not express), the results are bizarre.
For instance, suppose a secured party makes an uncommitted future advance while a
security interest is unperfected, but the secured party later perfects by filing. Because
the secured party did not make the advance either pursuant to commitment or while the
security interest was perfected, it is clear that neither of the first two sentences of § 9-
312(7) governs the situation. Rather, the last sentence of the section appears to apply
because the security interest is now perfected. If so, priority would date from the time
the advance was made, even if a conflicting security interest was perfected before the
advance lender filed. That, clearly, was not the intent of the drafters. The situation
belongs in § 9-312(5) so that priority would date from the time of filing or perfection.
95 U.C.C. § 9-312 comment 7 (1977); see 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 3, § 35.4, at 928.
If a junior secured party will not necessarily have notice of a perfected senior interest
(for example, if the senior interest is temporarily perfected without filing or possession),
the priority in the first sentence of § 9-312(7) does not apply. See U.C.C. § 9-312 com-
ment 7 (1977).
96 Jackson & Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities Among Creditors, 88 YALE L.J.
1143, 1178-82 (1979).
97 Id. at 1180.
98 See id.;Justice, supra note 1, at 918-20; Comment, Priority of Future Advances Lend-
ing Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 35 U. CH. L. REv. 128, 139-50 (1967).
99 See supra notes 14-25 and accompanying text.
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same priority as future advances made directly by the secured party.
Priority eliminates the need to check the record and obtain subordi-
nation agreements from other lien holders each time new credit is
extended. Perfection by the specified methods gives junior parties
notice of the senior interest and permits junior parties to protect
themselves. Presumably the costs avoided by senior interest-hold-
ers more than offset the costs imposed on junior parties.
2. Nonreliance Obligations
What is the proper treatment of converted obligations that do
not represent credit extended in reliance on the security interest?
Article 9 clearly contemplates that security agreements can cover
"nonreliance" obligations when the obligations represent value
given before the security agreement is executed. U.C.C. section 1-
201(44)(b) defines "value" to include taking security for a pre-ex-
isting debt 100 and thus assures that a security interest covering such
obligations can attach and be perfected. Given the decision to per-
mit Article 9 agreements to include nonreliance obligations among
"original" secured indebtedness, it makes sense to permit after-se-
cured nonreliance obligations. Conversion arrangements that reach
such obligations allow the parties to secure pre-existing debt with-
out the time and expense of executing a new security agreement and
filing a new financing statement.
To secure these advantages, however, it is unnecessary to treat
converted nonreliance obligations as future advances with priority
from the time of filing. Because non-reliance converted indebted-
ness does not represent secured credit, the transaction costs associ-
ated with that credit are unaffected by priority. Retroactive priority
merely gives the secured party an incentive to convert unsecured
claims and reap a windfall. A junior party aware of this possibility
would not lend at secured terms. Thus, granting a secured party
priority from the time of filing in these situations would impose
costs on lending by junior parties not offset by savings to senior
parties. The best solution is to date priority from the time nonreli-
ance obligations are converted.101 That date approximates the time
priority would commence had the parties created and perfected a
new security interest. 10 2 This approach captures the advantages of
100 U.C.C. § 1-201(44)(b) (1977). Thus when a security agreement covers pre-ex-
isting claims, the "agreement" and "value" requirements for attachment in U.C.C. § 9-
203(1)(a), (c) (1977) tend to collapse: when there is an agreement giving the secured
party security for the pre-existing claims, the secured party has given value.
101 Cf Jackson & Kronman, supra note 96, at 1181-82 (arguing that U.C.C. "notice-
filing" system should be replaced by "transactional filing system" when collateral con-
sists of "large, stable assets").
102 The secured party might argue that a new agreement covering pre-existing obli-
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conversion arrangements covering nonreliance obligations without
unjustifiably prejudicing third parties.10 3
3. The Inadequacies of the 1972 Version of U.C.C. Section 9-312
The treatment of future advances in U.C.C. section 9-312(7)
suggests that in priority contests between conflicting security inter-
ests one should distinguish converted claims that represent new
value given to the debtor in reliance on the security agreement from
other converted obligations. The former deserve as much protec-
tion as "true" future advances;' 0 4 the latter do not and should only
have priority from the time of the conversion.
The current version of section 9-312 does not distinguish be-
tween reliance and nonreliance obligations. It is clear, however, that
the provision dealing with future advances (section 9-312(7)) was
drafted with genuine future advances in mind. Thus section 9-
312(7) should apply to converted claims only if they represent new
value given in reliance on the security agreement. Construing the
term "advance" to reach only such claims and deeming such ad-
vances "made" when the converted claim first arose would yield
proper results for reliance obligations. In Heller, for instance, where
retroactive priority was necessary to induce extensions of new
credit, the secured party could claim priority with respect to the as-
signed claims over security interests perfected after Heller's filing.
Under the current version of Article 9, however, the priority of
nonreliance converted claims excluded from the term "advance" ap-
gations can be covered by a previous filing and the security interest would have priority
over interests arising after the filing. This priority, however, appears to represent an
oversight by the Article 9 drafters. There is no good reason to date priority from the
time of a previous filing in this situation, assuming the pre-existing obligations do not
represent new value given in reliance on the filing. This problem may lie behind cases
like Coin-o-Matic Serv. Co. v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co., 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Calla-
ghan) 1112 (R.I. Super. Ct. 1966), which held that the "first-to-file" rule in § 9-312(5)(a)
does not apply to certain future advances. The debtor executed a security agreement
with a car dealership that filed a financing statement. The agreement was assigned to
Rhode Island Hospital Trust Company. The Trust Company then advanced funds to
debtor, who executed a new agreement. Because the original agreement did not pro-
vide for future advances, the court held that the original filing did not give the Trust
Company priority over an intervening security interest. The Code does not require that
a security agreement expressly provide for future advances, and Coin-o-Matic has rightly
been criticized because it does not reflect the Code's policy of encouraging lending by
senior secured parties. E.g. ,J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 25-4, at 1038-40 (2d ed. 1980). If the new agreement
between debtor and the Trust Company had covered pre-existing unsecured claims
(compare Hypothetical C), however, the decision might be appealing.
103 Cf Justice, supra note 1, at 918 (to the extent priority is intended to promote
lending to debtors, priority for assigned debt is "unappealing" because debtor gets no
benefit from the assignment).
104 But see supra text accompanying notes 32-39.
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pears to be governed by the first-to-file-or-perfect rule in section 9-
312(5)(a). The priority afforded by this rule is unjustified and leads
to abuses. In Hypothetical A, for instance, section 9-312(5) would
give Lender priority over Bank. An extremely enlightened court
might be persuaded not to grant retroactive priority in such a situa-
tion on the principle that a rule should not apply where application
would violate its purpose. Such an approach, however, flies directly
in the face of the language of section 9-312(5), which states that the
provision applies "[i]n all cases not governed by other rules stated
in this section."1 05 The best solution, therefore, is to amend section
9-312.
IV
PRIORITY UNDER ARTICLE 9: CONVERTED CLAIMS AND
LIEN CREDITORS
The failure of Article 9 to distinguish obligations representing
new value advanced in reliance on a security interest from other se-
cured obligations also infects the priority rules applicable to con-
tests between secured parties and creditors who have obtained
judicial liens on the collateral. 10 6 The ability to convert obligations
under an existing security interest may permit an oversecured party
to "squeeze out" lien creditors who have executed on the collateral.
Where the converted debt is a nonreliance obligation, the power to
squeeze out judicial lienors cannot be justified.
A. "Multiple" vs. "Unitary" Security Interests under the 1962
Version of U.C.C. Article 9
Consider a priority contest between Lender and Tortvictim in
Hypothetical A. Under the 1962 version of Article 9, Lender's pri-
ority as to the claim acquired from Creditor is entirely unclear. 10 7
The 1962 version does not specifically address the priority of any
after-secured obligations, including future advances. This gap has
led to competing theories and results where a judgment creditor le-
vies on property before a secured party makes an advance but after
the secured party perfects an interest in the property.
One view, championed by Peter Coogan, 10 8 has been called the
105 U.C.C. § 9-312(5) (1977).
106 The priority rules applicable to inflatable lien/lien creditor contests are particu-
larly significant for their impact on the treatment of inflatable liens in bankruptcy. See
infra Part V.
107 Lender has priority as to its original claim under U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(b) (1962).
108 Coogan, Article 9 of the Uniforn Commercial Code: Priorities Among Secured Creditors and
the "Floating Lien," 72 HARV. L. REv. 838 (1959).
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"multiple theory."' 10 9 Proponents of this view point to the require-
ment that value be given before a security interest can attach."10
The "value" requirement, they argue, suggests that a future ad-
vance is secured by a security interest distinct and separate from the
interest securing the original advance."'t The separate security in-
terest securing a future advance does not attach to the collateral un-
til the advance or a commitment for the advance-the "value"-is
given. 112 Under the 1962 Code, a lien creditor has priority over a
security interest that is not perfected at the time he becomes a lien
creditor. 113 Because a security interest cannot be perfected until it
has attached, 114 a lien creditor, according to the multiple view, has
priority over the separate security interest securing an uncommitted
advance made after the judicial lien arose. 115
The opposing view has been called the "unitary theory,"' 1 6 and
its chief spokesman was Grant Gilmore.' 17 Under this view, a secur-
ity interest is accordion-like: it expands to cover future advances. 81 8
As soon as the creditor has given some value and the other require-
ments for attachment have been met, a unitary security interest at-
taches. 119 The unitary security interest thereafter absorbs future
advances. According to this view, a unitary security interest that
meets all the requirements for attachment and perfection before a
judgment creditor levies on the collateral gives the secured party
priority even as to advances made after a judgment creditor has
levied. 120
109 Schroeder & Carlson, Future Nonadvance Obligations under Article 9 of the UCC: Legiti-
mate Priority or Unwarranted Squeeze-Out?, 102 BANKING L.J. 412, 413, 418-20 (1985).
110 U.C.C. § 9-204(1) (1962); id. § 9-203(1)(b) (1972).
111 Coogan, supra note 108, at 867-68; Coogan, Intangibles as Collateral Under the Uni-
form Commercial Code, 77 HARV. L. REV. 997, 1019-20 (1964) [hereinafter Intangibles as
Collateral]; Coogan & Gordon, The Effect of the Uniform Commercial Code upon Receivables
Financing-Some Answers and Some Unresolved Problems, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1529, 1546-51
(1963); see also Schroeder & Carlson, supra note 109, at 418-20; Comment, supra note 98,
at 137-39.
112 E.g., 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 3, § 35.6, at 935-36, § 35.7, at 941; Intangibles As
Collateral, supra note 111, at 1028; Coogan, supra note 108, at 868 n.108.
113 U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(b) (1962).
114 Id. § 9-303(1) (1977) (unchanged from 1962 version).
115 E.g., 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 3, § 35.6, at 935-36; Comment, supra note 98, at
135-37.
116 Schroeder & Carlson, supra note 109, at 418-20.
117 See 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 3, § 35.6, at 937-39.
118 "Disbursements either create a security interest which is like one big cloud that
mushrooms as further advances are made; or they create security interests incapable of
growth, so that the advances generate a separate security interest-cloud-for each ad-
vance... " Comment, supra note 98, at 135.
119 E.g., 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 3, § 35.6, at 937-39; Comment, supra note 98, at
135-37.




The unitary theory permits secured parties to squeeze lien cred-
itors by making subsequent advances. A lien creditor, unlike a jun-
ior secured party, cannot adjust his credit terms to eliminate this
risk. Professor Gilmore justified the priority afforded by the unitary
theory on the grounds that future advances induced by the priority
rule enhance the debtor's estate and thus increase the lien creditor's
chance of recovering on his claim. 121 In other words, the advance
compensates the lien creditor for being squeezed, and priority en-
courages advances by eliminating the cost of checking the records
each time an advance is contemplated.
B. Applying the Unitary and Multiple Theories to Converted
Claims under the 1962 Version of Article 9
Under the 1962 version of Article 9, priority between secured
parties and lien creditors as to claims converted after the judicial
lien attached depends on resolving the unitary/multiple debate. If
the unitary theory is applied to Hypothetical A, 1 22 for instance,
Lender's original security interest can expand to absorb the debt
Lender acquired from Creditor. Because Lender did everything re-
quired to perfect its "unitary" security interest in 1983, Tortvictim
took subject to the assigned claim that the perfected security inter-
est later absorbed.' 23 Under the unitary theory, converted claims
secured by a security interest that attached and was perfected before
a lien creditor levied have priority no matter when the conversion
occurred.
Under the multiple theory, the converted claims are secured by
a separate security interest that does not attach and cannot be per-
fected until the necessary value is given. When was that? There are
two possibilities. First, value was given under section 1-201(44)(b)
when the secured party acquired security for the converted claim-
that is, at the time of conversion. Thus, in Hypothetical A, Lender
gave value when it acquired Creditor's claim. t24 If this is the value
that permits attachment, Tortvictim has priority under section 9-
301(1)(b) because the separate security interest securing the ac-
quired claim was not perfected until after Tortvictim levied.
Second, value was given when the subsequently converted
121 See 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 3, § 35.6, at 939; Schroeder & Carlson, supra note
109, at 420, 423-24.
122 See supra text accompanying notes 6-9.
123 See U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(b) (1962); Justice, supra note 1, at 918.
124 A previous commentator apparently assumed (but did not examine) this view.
See Justice, supra note 1, at 918. As explained at supra note 93, § 1-201(44)(b) provides
that a person who acquires security for a pre-existing claim thereby gives value. Because
the assignment converted Creditor's claim into a secured obligation, Lender gave value
by taking the assignment (even if the assignment had been gratuitous).
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claim first arose. Section 9-203(1)(b) does not state that the value
necessary for attachment must be given by the secured party. 125
Thus, in Hypothetical A, Creditor's loan to Debtor may satisfy the
value requirement. 126 Under this view, priority depends on when
Creditor made the loan. If the loan was made before August 10,
Tortvictim's claim is subordinate because all the requirements for
attachment and perfection of the separate security interest occurred
before Tortvictim levied.1 27 If Creditor's loan was made after Au-
gust 10, however, Tortvictim has priority because the value neces-
sary for the separate security interest to attach 128 was not given until
after the levy.
It is clear that Creditor in Hypothetical A did not lend in reli-
ance on Lender's inflatable lien. The priority the unitary approach
affords was therefore not instrumental in making compensatory as-
sets available to Tortvictim. Professor Gilmore's rationale for the
unitary theory does not justify giving Lender priority. Permitting
Lender to squeeze Tortvictim merely creates opportunities for
abuse. Tortvictim deserves priority, yet only the first approach
under the multiple theory129 always yields this result.
In Heller,130 however, the suppliers relied on the inflatable lien
when they shipped goods to Bemporad on an unsecured basis. In
this case Professor Gilmore's argument for the "unitary" approach
applies. Without priority, Heller would not have agreed to purchase
the suppliers' accounts and the suppliers would not have given new
value. Because the suppliers' shipments enhanced Bemporad's es-
tate, Bemporad's lien creditors would be compensated and could
justifiably be squeezed. Only the unitary theory always yields this
result.
In short, neither the unitary nor the multiple view distinguishes
between converted obligations representing value given in reliance
on a security interest and non-reliance converted debt. Thus to
achieve proper results, one must adopt different views depending
on the circumstances.
125 U.C.C. § 9-203(l)(b) (1977) (requiring that "value has been given").
126 Id. § 1-201(44)(a) (1977) ("value" includes "the extension of immediately avail-
able credit").
127 The security agreement was executed in 1983, id. § 9-203(1)(a), Creditor gave
value before the levy, id. § 9-203(l)(b), Debtor had rights in the collateral in 1983, id.
§ 9-203(l)(c), and Lender filed in 1983, id. §§ 9-303(1), 9-302(1).
128 Id. § 9-203(1)(b).
129 See supra text accompanying note 124.
130 Shaw v. Walter E. Heller & Co., 258 F. Supp. 394 (N.D. Ga. 1966), rev'd on other
grounds, 385 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1003 (1968) (discussed supra
notes 14-25 and accompanying text).
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C. Converted Claims and Lien Creditors under the 1972
Version of Article 9
One commentator described the "multiple" vs. "unitary" ap-
proach to the priority of future advances under the 1962 version of
Article 9 as an exercise in "Heraclitian metaphysics." 13' The 1972
amendments attempt to side-step the debate.' 3 2 Rather than declar-
ing whether the security interest securing a future advance is multi-
ple or unitary,'33 the drafters added a compromise priority rule.
Under the new version of section 9-301(4), a party with a perfected
security interest has priority over a levying creditor for advances
made before or within 45 days after the levy and for all advances
made without knowledge of the levy (or pursuant to a commitment
made without such knowledge). The lien creditor has priority over
all other advances.
Treating converted obligations as "advances" governed by sec-
tion 9-301(4) is justified in situations like Heller. Because the ar-
rangements in that case generated more assets for Bemporad's
judgment creditors to reach, Heller should enjoy the same priority it
would have had if it had made advances to permit Bemporad to pay
suppliers in cash.' 34 Section 9-301(4) yields unacceptable results
131 Comment, supra note 98, at 134.
132 IA SECURED TRANSACTIONS, supra note 37, § 7.07(6), at 7A-58.
133 Professor Carlson and his co-authors assert that the 1972 amendments adopt the
multiple view. Carlson & Shupack, supra note 88, at 347 n.255; Schroeder & Carlson,
supra note 109, at 418. They argue that a lien creditor has priority with respect to inter-
est charges, collection costs, collateral preservation expenses, and similar items covered
by a senior security interest, unless such charges mature or accrue before the lien credi-
tor levies. Those items, it is argued, constitute "nonadvance value"--that is, value not
within the term "advance"-and thus are subordinate under U.C.C. § 9-301(4) to a lien
creditor who levies before the charges accrue or mature. Carlson & Shupack, supra note
88, at 352-59; Schroeder & Carlson, supra note 109, at 422-24. "Nonadvance value,"
however, is not value at all; rather, it is part of the original secured obligation. The time
when interest and expenses accrue or mature should be irrelevant for priority purposes.
See Dick Warner Cargo Handling Corp. v. Aetna Business Credit, Inc., 746 F.2d 126 (2d
Cir. 1984).
134 There are, however, interpretative difficulties. For instance, if the converted ob-
ligations in Heller are treated as advances governed by § 9-301(4), when were the ad-
vances "made"? At the time the suppliers gave new value by shipping (or committing to
ship) goods on credit-that is, at the time the converted obligations arose-rather than
the time the "conversion" occurred is the best answer. Once the suppliers gave or com-
mitted new value to Bemporad, they could not take back the value or commitment even
if they acquired knowledge of a judicial lien before the obligation was converted. Thus,
as soon as the suppliers shipped or committed to ship on credit, the debtor's lien credi-
tors received "compensation." But see Justice, supra note 1, at 919 (assuming that, under
§ 9-301(4), advance would be deemed "made" when conversion occurred).
In a situation like Heller, whose knowledge of intervening judicial liens is relevant
for § 9-301(4) purposes? Because the limited priority given advances made with knowl-
edge of an intervening judicial lien is designed to avoid conscious manipulation by the
secured party, Heller's knowledge, rather than that of the suppliers, should control.
So interpreted, § 9-301(4) yields acceptable results whenever converted obligations
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when applied to non-reliance converted debt, however. In Hypo-
thetical A, for instance, Lender should not be permitted to squeeze
judicial lienors whose interests attached before Creditor's claim was
converted. Creditor's loan was not induced by a priority security
interest, 35 and Tortvictim received no "compensation." Giving
Lender priority for obligations converted after Tortvictim levied
only creates opportunities for abuse, yet that is the result under sec-
tion 9-301(4). The sensible approach is to date priority from the
time of conversion, because Lender would enjoy such priority if, on
the date of the assignment, it had created and perfected a new se-
curity interest covering the claim assigned by Creditor.
One commentator has argued that converted obligations do not
represent advances and that section 9-301(4) subordinates such ob-
ligations to a lien creditor. 136 Because section 9-301(4) provides
that a lien creditor takes subject to a security interest "only to the
extent it secures advances," the argument runs, a lien creditor must
have priority over "nonadvance" converted debt. 3 7 This approach
would favor Tortvictim over Lender in Hypothetical A. The argu-
ment, however, would also give Tortvictim priority if Lender had
acquired Creditor's claim before Tortvictim levied because assigned
debt is not an advance and a lien creditor is subordinate "only" to
advances.138 Because this approach would subordinate converted
debt to a lien creditor even if conversion occurred years before the
lien creditor levied, a bankruptcy trustee of the debtor could always
avoid the lien securing the assigned claims under section 544(a) of
the Bankruptcy Code.'3 9 In other words, this approach yields ab-
represent new value advanced to the debtor in reliance on the security interest. Under
this approach, Heller would have priority over all judicial liens that arose up to 45 days
before the suppliers' shipments or commitments. In addition, Heller would have prior-
ity over all judicial liens of which it was ignorant when the suppliers shipped or commit-
ted to ship.
135 This is true even if Debtor actually agreed to permit the kind of "conversion"
that occurred in Hypothetical A. Meaningful assent by the debtor to "conversion" ar-
rangements, of course, is a prerequisite to reaching priority questions. See supra text
accompanying notes 69-73.
136 SeeJustice, supra note 1, at 919-20.
137 Id.
138 Cf Dick Warner Cargo, 746 F.2d at 133-34 (rejecting literal reading of § 9-301(4)
because it would give lien creditor priority over everything that is not an "advance" no
matter when "nonadvances" occurred).
139 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (Supp. III 1985). See infra note 147. Furthermore, unless a
distinction between reliance and nonreliance converted debt is drawn, any levying credi-
tor would have priority over the assigned claims in Heller, and Heller's security interest
would be vulnerable to the bankruptcy trustee's powers under 11 U.S.C. § 544(a). This
problem could be solved by construing the term "advance" in U.G.C. § 9-301(4) to in-
clude converted claims representing new value given in reliance on the inflatable lien.
See supra Part III, penultimate paragraph.
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surd results, and reflects a misreading of the statute.' 40
To achieve proper results, courts should construe the term "ad-
vances" in section 9-301(4) to include converted obligations only if
they represent new value advanced in reliance on the security inter-
est (for example, the suppliers' claims in Heller 141) and hold section
9-301(4) inapplicable to other converted claims. This interpretation
leaves priority between nonreliance converted obligations and judi-
cial liens ambiguous under the 1972 amendments to Article 9 and
leads back to the unitary/multiple debate. The multiple view, if in-
terpreted so that the separate security interest securing non-reliance
claims does not attach until conversion occurs, yields proper re-
sults, 14 2 although its application is absurdly complicated and may be
inconsistent with the drafting of the 1972 amendments. 143
140 Justice argues that U.C.C. § 9-204(3) distinguishes between an "advance" and
"other value." By failing to mention other value, he argues, § 9-301(4) subordinates it
to lien creditors. Justice, supra note 1, at 919-20. Cf Carlson & Shupack, supra note 88,
at 353-56 (reasoning that interest payments constitute value, but not future advances).
The drafting history of the Code reveals what the drafters meant by "other value"
in § 9-204(3). In the 1952 version of the Code, this provision (numbered 9-204(5) until
1972) said simply that a security agreement could cover "future advances." 15 UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE DRAFrs 216 (E. Kelly comp. 1984). The second paragraph of com-
ment 8 to § 9-204 stated that "advance" meant only a loan of money and that a security
agreement could not cover future sales of goods on credit. Id. at 220. The New York
legislature criticized this limitation when it studied the U.C.C. in 1954-56. It suggested
that language be added to clarify that an Article 9 security agreement could also cover
future sales of goods on credit. 2 N.Y. LAW REVISION COMM'N, REPORT FOR 1954, LEGIS-
LATIVE Doc. No. 65, 1021 (1954); 3 N.Y. LAW REVISION COMM'N, REPORT FOR 1955,
LEGISLATIVE Doc. No. 65, 2051 (1955); N.Y. LAw REVISION COMM'N, REPORT FOR 1956,
LEGISLATIVE Doc. No. 65, 470 (1956). In response, the U.C.C. drafters added the
"other value" language and dropped the second paragraph of comment 8 to § 9-204.
20 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE DRAFTS, supra, at 155, 158.
If the drafters of § 9-301(4) intended to subordinate "other value" to lien credi-
tors, they must have intended to subordinate all credit that did not take the form of
money advances, an idea not even hinted at in the comments. In fact, Justice himself
rejects that result, although apparently unaware of the drafting history behind "other
value." Justice, supra note 1, at 919.
In short, the drafters of § 9-301(4) did not intend to distinguish between advances
and other value and did not intend to subordinate the latter to lien creditors. See Dick
Warner Cargo, 746 F.2d at 133-34.
141 This interpretation of "advance" should also apply under U.C.C. § 9-307(3)
(1977) (governing contests between non-ordinary-course buyers and secured parties).
142 In Hypothetical A, for instance, this interpretation gives Tortvictim priority over
Lender. Because the assigned claim does not represent new value given in reliance on
Lender's security interest, it is not an "advance" governed by § 9-301(4). The separate
security interest securing the assigned claim did not attach and could not be perfected
until conversion occurred. Because conversion occurred after Tortvictim levied, Lender
is subordinate to Tortvictim as to the assigned claim under § 9-301(1)(b).
143 The drafters of the 1972 amendments appear to have conceived of security inter-
ests in unitary terms. Section 9-301(4), for instance, begins as follows: "A person who
becomes a lien creditor while a security interest is perfected takes subject to the security
interest ... ." U.C.C. § 9-301(4) (1977). The second reference to "security interest"
must, because of the definite article ("the security interest"), refer back to the first refer-
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The drafters of section 9-301(4) did not anticipate the possibil-
ity that a security interest could cover previously unsecured claims
converted into secured obligations after the security interest at-
tached. Indeed, the intellectual contortions required to apply any of
the Article 9 priority rules to converted debt demonstrates that
neither the 1962 nor the 1972 versions deal adequately with inflat-
able liens and related phenomena. The consequences of this failure
are bad enough when a dispute arises between competing claimants
to collateral; the confusion is compounded when the debtor enters
bankruptcy proceedings.
V
CONVERTED DEBT AND BANKRUPTCY
Hypotheticals A, B, and C represent unjustifiable attempts by
secured parties to exploit an oversecured position at the expense of
an insolvent debtor's general creditors. A trustee in bankruptcy
should be able to use his avoiding powers under the Bankruptcy
Code1 44 to prevent such abuse. Transactions like those in Heller, on
the other hand, are not abusive and should not be subject to avoid-
ance. Unfortunately, the failure of both state law and the Bankruptcy
Code to anticipate the phenomenon of converted debt makes it diffi-
ence-a security interest that is perfected when the judgment lien arises. Thus, § 9-
301(4) appears to give priority only if the security interest securing a subsequent ad-
vance is perfected when the intervening judgment lien arises. Under the multiple the-
ory, that situation is rare. The separate security interest securing an advance cannot be
perfected under the multiple view until the advance is made, unless the advance is made
pursuant to a previous commitment. Section 9-301(I)(b) in the 1972 Code gives lien
creditors priority over unperfected security interests without exception. Thus, if one
adopts the metaphysics of the multiple view, a voluntary future advance made within 45
days after a levy or made without knowledge of the levy would, because of § 9-301(1)(b),
be subordinate despite § 9-301(4). The last clause of§ 9-301(4), however, suggests that
the drafters intended the provision to give priority to uncommitted advances.
Furthermore, § 9-301(4) refers to a security interest's having priority to the extent
that "it secures advances." The idea of one security interest securing multiple "ad-
vances" contradicts the multiple theory, unless the advances are all made pursuant to
the same commitment. In addition, the drafters phrased § 9-301(4) as if it cuts back on
priority that the secured party would otherwise have. (A lien creditor is subordinate
"only to the extent.") Section 9-301(4) is a limitation on the priority of secured parties
only under the unitary theory: Under the multiple theory, § 9-301(4) expands rather
than constricts that priority. In short, the only way to make sense of § 9-301(4) is to
adopt a unitary conception of security interests.
There is other evidence of the unitary concept in the 1972 amendments. Section 9-
307(3), for instance, also contemplates a single security interest securing a series of vol-
untary future advances. In addition, commenting on changes in § 9-312, the drafters
addressed the unfairness of squeezing out lien creditors "by permitting later enlarge-
ment of the security interest by an additional advance." U.C.C. § 9-312, Reasons for
1972 Change, § 5. The security interest posited by the multiple theory cannot be "en-
larged" by an advance unless the advance is "committed" at the time of the original
credit; only a unitary security interest can be "enlarged" by a voluntary advance.
144 11 U.S.C. §§ 544-45, 547-49, 553(b) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
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cult, although not impossible, to regulate abuses while preserving
legitimate transactions.
A. Bankruptcy Preference Provisions and Converted Debt
In Hypotheticals A, B and C, the secured parties attempted to
convert debt shortly before the debtor declared bankruptcy. The
timing suggests that the preference provision (section 547) of the
Bankruptcy Code, 145 which permits the trustee to avoid certain eve-
of-bankruptcy transfers, 146 may play a critical role in the proper reg-
ulation of converted indebtedness in bankruptcy.147 A situation like
145 Id. § 547.
146 To recover a preference under § 547 of the Bankruptcy Code, the trustee must
establish that there has been a "transfer of an interest of the debtor in property" with
the following attributes: (1) the transfer must be "to or for the benefit of a creditor"; (2)
the transfer must be "for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before
the transfer was made"; (3) the transfer must occur when the debtor is insolvent (the
debtor is presumed insolvent during the 90 days preceding the bankruptcy petition
under § 547(f)); (4) the transfer must occur within 90 days of the bankruptcy petition, or
within one year of the petition if the creditor is an "insider" (as defined in § 101(28));
(5) the transfer must make the creditor better off than he would have been if the transfer
had not occurred and the creditor had asserted the antecedent debt in liquidation pro-
ceedings for the debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(1)-(5) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
147 This discussion focuses on the application of preference and fraudulent transfer
law to conversion of unsecured obligations into secured debt before bankruptcy pro-
ceedings intervene. The trustee's other avoiding powers are normally unavailing in such
situations. For instance, the transactions in Hypothetical A are not vulnerable under
§ 544(a), which permits the trustee to avoid a transfer if a creditor who had obtained a
judicial lien on the debtor's property on the date of the bankruptcy petition would have
priority over the transferee. 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1) (Supp. III 1985). As long as the
parties actually agreed to permit conversion, Lender in Hypothetical A should have pri-
ority over a lien creditor who did not levy until the date of Debtor's bankruptcy petition.
See supra text accompanying notes 141-43. The trustee could use § 544(b) to avoid the
conversion in Hypothetical A only if he could locate an actual unsecured claimant who
would have priority over Lender. 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) (1982). Unless assignment of the
claim to Lender constituted a fraudulent conveyance under state law, see infra text ac-
companying notes 182-96, it is unlikely that the trustee could find such a claimant.
Where conversion does not occur until after the bankruptcy petition is filed, as was
the case in Fretz, see supra text accompanying notes 75-78, § 544(a) might come into play.
If obligations converted post-petition do not represent new value given in reliance on
the security interest, priority over judicial lien creditors should not begin until conver-
sion, see supra text accompanying note 135, and the trustee could avoid the conversion
under his hypothetical lien creditor powers. Indeed, the attempt to convert such obliga-
tions post-petition might violate § 362(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code, which extends the
automatic stay to "any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the
estate." 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(4) (1982). If the obligations converted post-petition repre-
sent new value extended pre-petition in reliance on the security interest, however, the
conversion should not be vulnerable under § 544(a). In this circumstance, the con-
verted debt should have priority over judicial liens that arose after the giving of new
value. See supra text accompanying notes 134 & 141. Furthermore, the post-petition
conversion of such obligations should not violate the automatic stay, which does not
apply to perfection of a lien if perfection gives the lien-holder retroactive priority over




Hypothetical A has, in fact, all the indicia of a preference.1 48 Lender
is a creditor of Debtor who has made a "last minute grab"'
149 of
rights in Debtor's assets. Unless the "grab" is avoided, a portion of
Debtor's value will be diverted from the pool available to Debtor's
unsecured creditors and used for the benefit of one claimant. The
result thus disturbs the "equality of distribution" that section 547
was designed to promote. 150 Indeed, an attempt by Lender to
achieve directly the substance of the transaction in Hypothetical A
by procuring a new security interest within the preference period to
secure the claim acquired from Creditor would constitute a classic
voidable preference.
The difficulty in using preference law to prevent Lender's ma-
neuver is that section 547 requires transfer of an interest in Debtor's
property (specifically, the security interest securing the claim as-
signed to Lender' 51) during the statutory period. 152 Under section
547(e), the time at which a security interest is transferred is deter-
mined by the temporal relationship between attachment (the time a
security interest "takes effect between the transferor and the trans-
feree"'153) and perfection against a lien creditor of the debtor.'
54
Unfortunately, as has been demonstrated, the times at which the se-
curity interest securing the claim assigned to Lender in Hypothetical
A attached and was perfected against lien creditors of Debtor are
unclear.1
55
Under both the 1962 and 1972 versions of Article 9, the secur-
148 See Carlson & Shupack, supra note 88, at 364; Justice, supra note 1, at 920-28;
Shanor, supra note 6, at 603-10.
149 Jackson, Avoiding Powers in Bankruptcy, 36 STAN. L. REV. 725, 760 (1984).
150 See 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 547.03 (15th ed. 1986); Carlson & Shupack,
supra note 88, at 364.
151 11 U.S.C. § 101 (48) (Supp. III 1985) (defining "transfer" to include taking se-
curity interest in collateral).
152 Under § 547(b)(4) the statutory period is 90 days prior to the bankruptcy peti-
tion, assuming Lender was not an "insider" of Debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4) (1982 &
Supp. III 1985).
153 Id. § 547(e)(2)(A) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). Under the 1972 version of Article 9,
a security interest becomes "enforceable against the debtor" when it attaches. U.C.C.
§ 9-203(2) (1972).
154 Under § 547(e)(1)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code, a transfer of an interest in per-
sonal property is perfected for preference purposes "when a creditor on a simple con-
tract cannot acquire a judicial lien that is superior to the interest of the transferee." 11
U.S.C. § 547(e)(1)(B) (1982). If the transfer is perfected at or within 10 days of the time
it takes effect, the transfer is made when it takes effect. Id. § 547(e)(2)(A). If the transfer
is perfected more than 10 days after it takes effect and not after the bankruptcy proceed-
ing commences, the transfer is made when perfected. Id. § 547(e)(2)(B). If the transfer
is perfected after the later of commencement and 10 days following the time it takes
effect, the transfer is made "immediately before the date of the filing of the petition." Id.
§ 547(e)(2)(C) (Supp. III 1985). In any event, a transfer cannot be made before the
debtor acquires rights in the property transferred. Id. § 547(e)(3) (1982).
155 See supra Part IV.
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ity interest securing the assigned claim in Hypothetical A should be
deemed transferred for preference purposes at the time of assign-
ment. In other words, the claim should be treated as secured by a
separate security interest (as posited by the multiple theory) which
did not attach and could not be perfected against lien creditors of
Debtor until Lender gave value by receiving security for Creditor's
pre-existing claim. 156 Under section 547(e)(2)(A), this separate se-
curity interest would be deemed transferred for preference pur-
poses on August 15, 1986,157 within the 90-day preference period.
Because an antecedent debt (the debt originally due Creditor) gave
rise to the transfer and the other elements of section 547(b) appear
to be satisfied, 158 the trustee could avoid the lien securing the as-
signed claim. Lender would be relegated to a $50,000 unsecured
claim.159
Assigned claims in situations like Heller,160 in contrast, do not
violate preference law policies and should be treated as future ad-
vances. Where the 1972 version of Article 9 applies, construing the
term "advance" in U.C.C. section 9-301(4) to include converted ob-
ligations if, but only if, they represent new value given in reliance on
the security interest would solve this problem. Under this approach,
156 See U.C.C. § 1-201(44)(b) (1977); supra text accompanying notes 124 & 143.
Some jurisdictions may have adopted the unitary approach in priority contests involving
future advances. E.g., Friedlander v. Adelphi Mfg., 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 7
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968). Only extreme loyalty to metaphysical consistency, however, would
prevent courts in such jurisdictions from making an exception and adopting the multiple
approach for situations such as Hypothetical A. Indeed, Professor Gilmore himself, the
leading spokesman for the unitary view, was extremely hostile to abuses involving con-
verted obligations. See 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 3, § 35.2, at 918.
157 In other words, the separate security interest both attached and was perfected
against lien creditors when Creditor assigned its claim to Lender-on August 15. The
transfer would be deemed made on that date under the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C.
§ 547(e)(2)(A) (1982).
158 See supra note 146. The transfer was to a creditor (Lender), Debtor was insolvent
on the date of the transfer, and the transfer of the security interest permitted Lender to
receive more than if the transfer had not been made (assuming that unsecured creditors
of Debtor would receive less than full payment in a Chapter 7 liquidation).
159 One must make certain fine distinctions in handling assigned claims in bank-
ruptcy. If Lender's actions in Hypothetical A were properly characterized as, in effect,
an advance of $5,000 to Debtor used to settle Creditor's claim, Lender should properly
receive a $5,000 additional secured claim rather than a $50,000 unsecured claim. The
different treatment will matter if the amount paid for the claim differs from the amount
the claim will fetch if treated as an unsecured claim in bankruptcy. The amount a se-
cured party pays for a claim should be treated as a secured advance only if the secured
party and debtor agreed that the secured party would settle a claim on behalf of
debtor-that is, if the secured party intended to make an indirect loan to debtor rather
than to acquire the claim of the third party creditor. Lender in Hypothetical A asserted
the full amount of Creditor's claim in bankruptcy, undermining the suggestion that
Lender in effect loaned Debtor $5,000 to extinguish Creditor's claim.
160 258 F. Supp. 394 (N.D. Ga. 1966), rev'd on other grounds, 385 F.2d 353 (5th Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1003 (1968); see supra notes 14-25 and accompanying text.
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the security interest securing the assigned claims in Heller would be
deemed transferred for preference purposes no later than the time
the claims arose.16 1 Thus, the "antecedent debt" requirement of
section 547 would protect the transactions from preference attack.
Where the 1962 version of Article 9 remains applicable, similar re-
sults can be achieved under either the unitary or multiple
theories. 
162
B. Complications: Inventory and Receivables Collateral
Although the solution requires a complex result-oriented read-
ing of Article 9 priority rules, current preference law can prevent
abuses of converted indebtedness while preserving legitimate trans-
actions where the collateral is equipment (as in Hypotheticals A, B
and C). Where the security interest covers inventory or receivables,
however, further difficulties arise. Section 547(c)(5) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code, which regulates floating liens for preference purposes,
provides that the trustee cannot avoid the transfer of a perfected
security interest in inventory or receivables unless the secured party
has improved its position.' 63 Prohibited improvement occurs only if
161 The security interest securing such "advances" (which should be deemed
"made" when the suppliers gave or committed to give new value by extending credit to
Bemporad) would have priority over a judicial lien under U.C.C. § 9-301(4) if the judi-
cial lien arose less than 45 days before the advances. The security interest would thus be
perfected under 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(1)(B) (1982) 45 days before the suppliers extended
credit. The security interest securing the advances attached under the unitary view
when Heller's security interest in the collateral first attached; under the appropriate in-
terpretation of the multiple view, see supra text accompanying note 125, it attached when
the suppliers shipped (or agreed to ship) on credit. In either case, the security interest
would be transferred under the timing rules of § 547(e)(2) no later than the time the
suppliers extended (or committed to extend) credit.
162 Under the unitary view, the security interest securing the assigned claims both
attached and was perfected against lien creditors when Heller first acquired a perfected
security interest in the collateral-well before the suppliers' claims arose. Under the
multiple view, the value that permits the separate security interest securing the suppli-
ers' claims to attach (and be perfected against lien creditors) should be deemed given
when the suppliers extended (or committed to extend) credit to Bemporad. See supra
text accompanying note 125. Thus, the security interest securing the suppliers' claims
would be transferred under the timing rules in § 547(e)(2) at the same time the claims
arose. Under either approach, the transfer of the security interest would not meet the
antecedent debt requirement.
163 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(5) (Supp. III 1985). Many commentators have discussed the
background and operation of § 547(c)(5). E.g., Countryman, The Concept of a Voidable
Preference in Bankruptcy, 38 VAND. L. REV. 713, 790-801 (1985); Countryman, Bankruptcy
Preferences-Current Law and Proposed Changes, 11 U.C.C. LJ. 95, 103-04 (1978); Hogan,
Games Lawyers Play with the Bankruptcy Preference Challenge to Accounts and Inventory Financing,
53 CORNELL L. REV. 553 (1968); Kaye, Preferences Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 54 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 197, 207-11 (1980); Shanor, supra note 6, at 603-10; Young, Preferences Under
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 54 AM. BANKR. L.J. 221, 232-36 (1980); Note,Avoidance




the amount by which the secured indebtedness exceeds the value of
the collateral (the "unsecured deficiency") at the beginning of the
preference period (or, if later, the date new value was first given
under the security agreement) is greater than the unsecured defi-
ciency at the time of the bankruptcy petition.
Suppose the collateral in Hypothetical A was inventory rather
than equipment. Lender had no unsecured deficiency (indeed, it
was over-secured) at the beginning of the preference period. Thus
Lender could not improve its position within the meaning of section
547(c)(5). Literally applied, the exception appears to shield the se-
curity interest securing the claim acquired by Lender from prefer-
ence attack. 164
The solution is to limit the application of section 547(c)(5) to
those situations for which it was designed-transfers of security in-
terests in after-acquired collateral caused by the debtor acquiring
rights in such collateral during the preference period. The excep-
tion should not apply to transfers arising from the conversion of
previously unsecured obligations into secured debt because the re-
sults would undermine the purposes of preference law. "The prob-
lem with this argument," notes one commentator, "is that the
statutory language does not support it."165
The failure of section 547 to solve the problem of obligations
converted to secured debt on the eve of bankruptcy is surprising
because its drafters declared their intention to overrule a case which
permitted such conversion. In In re King-Porter Co.,166 debtor en-
tered into a security agreement with the Mills Morris Company, an
inventory supplier. The collateral was debtor's current and after-
acquired inventory. The secured obligations included "any existing
and future indebtedness" to Mills Morris. 167 Mills Morris began to
ship appliances to debtor on credit and perfected by filing on Febru-
ary 25. On April 25, Mills Morris took an assignment of open-ac-
count claims for 112 air conditioners debtor had purchased from
Kelvinator on March 28.168 Mills Morris repossessed all but 11 of
the air conditioners on May 31. On June 5, debtor filed for
bankruptcy. 169
The district court held that the assignment to Mills Morris gave
164 See Shanor, supra note 6, at 607-08.
165 Id. at 608 n.80.
166 446 F.2d 722 (5th Cir. 1971).
167 Id. at 725.
168 The assignment was part of a distributorship agreement between Mills Morris
and Kelvinator. Mills Morris purchased the claims from Kelvinator for face value on July
2. Id. at 725-26.
169 Id. at 726.
1987]
CORNELL LA W REVIEW
rise to a preference under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.170 The Fifth
Circuit reversed, holding that the security interest securing the
claims assigned to Mills Morris was transferred when Mills Morris
perfected by filing on February 25.171 Because the assigned claims
did not arise until March 28, the court reasoned, the transfer was
not on account of an antecedent debt. 172
The Fifth Circuit clearly confused the situation in King-Porter
with cases involving the validity of floating liens in bankruptcy-a
controversy that was still raging at the time. 173 Although Mills Mor-
ris' security interest covered collateral acquired by the debtor dur-
ing the preference period, that was not its objectionable feature. By
acquiring Kelvinator's unsecured claim, Mills Morris converted it
into a secured obligation on the eve of bankruptcy. If debtor had
given Kelvinator a security interest on April 25, the situation would
clearly involve a preference. In its zeal to shield floating liens from
preference attack, the King-Porter court failed to notice this aspect of
the transaction.
Several commentators 174 criticized King-Porter, and the drafters
of the Bankruptcy Code attempted to overrule the case. The Senate
Report on the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 states that section
547(e)(3), "in combination with subsection (b)(2) [requiring that a
transfer be "for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the
debtor before such transfer was made"], overrules In re King-Porter
Co. " 175
The provisions cited in the Senate Report, however, do not de-
feat the King Porter analysis. Section 547(e)(3) provides that a secur-
ity interest cannot be transferred until the debtor has rights in the
collateral. 176 In King-Porter, however, the debtor received rights in
the 112 air conditioners at the same time the debt to Kelvinator
arose. Thus, the antecedent debt requirement would be unsatisfied
on such facts despite section 547(e)(3). 177 Under current law, even
170 Id. at 727. The district court also held that the creation of a security interest to
secure the assigned claims was a fraudulent transfer. Id.
171 Id. at 730.
172 Id. at 732-33. Compare the results in In re Wilco Forest Machinery, Inc., 491
F.2d 1041 (5th Cir. 1974), described supra text accompanying notes 26-31.
173 For accounts of this controversy, see sources cited supra note 163.
174 In the 1972 edition of their treatise, Professors White and Summers described
the King-Porter holding as follows: "A party . . . can convert what would have been a
preferential security transfer if made to him into a non-preferential transfer merely by
assigning his own claim to another party who has a security interest in assets of the
common debtor .. " J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 102, § 24-5, at 883 (1972);
see also Kennedy, Secured Transactions, 27 Bus. LAw. 755, 769-70 (1972).
175 S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 89, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5787, 5875.
176 11 U.S.C. 547(e)(3) (1982).
177 See Justice, supra note 1, at 925-26.
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if debtor acquired new collateral after the Kelvinator claim arose,
the exception in section 547(c)(5) might have shielded the transac-
tion.1 78 At any rate, section 547(e) (3) will not help in a situation like
Hypothetical A, where the inflatable lien does not cover after-ac-
quired property.' 79 Furthernore, the Senate Report's statement
that the antecedent debt requirement in section 547(b)(2) helps to
overrule King-Porter is misleading. The current wording of section
547(b)(2) does nothing to solve the problems raised by Hypotheti-
cal A and King-Porter.180 In short, the attempt to overrule King Porter
in section 547 was unsuccessful.18 '
C. Fraudulent Conveyance Law
Given the shortcoming of current preference law, trustees
might turn to fraudulent conveyance law to deal with converted ob-
ligations. Unfortunately, neither the fraudulent transfer provision
of the Bankruptcy Code 182 nor state fraudulent conveyance law
183
appears adequate for this purpose. For instance, assuming that the
transaction which originally gave rise to Creditor's claim in Hypo-
thetical A did not constitute a fraudulent conveyance, the trustee's
only recourse is to attack the transfer of the security interest to
Lender. 184 That transfer is probably not avoidable under section
178 See supra text accompanying notes 163-65.
179 See Justice, supra note 1, at 926.
180 In King-Porter the inflatable lien holder (Mills Morris) purchased Kelvinator's
claim by assuming liability for debts owed to Kelvinator. 446 F.2d at 725. The Fifth
Circuit strongly implied that the security interest securing the assigned claim should be
deemed transferred on account of Mills Morris's assumption of liability rather than by
virtue of the pre-existing debt owed to Kelvinator. The court ruled that Mills Morris's
assumption of liability constituted "value" to the debtor. Id. Compare the value analy-
sis under the multiple theory, supra note 124 and accompanying text. The Bankruptcy
Code drafters may have felt that the language of § 547(b) (2) overruled the Fifth Circuit's
value analysis in King-Porter.
181 See Justice, supra note 1, at 925. This failure is particularly surprising given the
drafters' successful handling of analogous situations in the context of setoff. See 11
U.S.C. § 553(a)(2) (1982); see also Justice, supra note 1, at 930; Shanor, supra note 6, at
608 n.80.
182 11 U.S.C.A. § 548 (West Supp. 1987).
183 If there were an unsecured creditor of the debtor who could avoid a transfer
under state fraudulent conveyance law, the trustee could invoke the state law. 11 U.S.C.
§ 544(b) (1982) (trustee succeeds to powers of actual unsecured creditors of debtor).
184 Fraudulent transfer law often has a limited "reach back" period. For example,
under § 548(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, the transfer must occur within one year of the
petition date. Id § 548(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). Under the new Uniform Fraudulent
Transfer Act, which at the time of writing has been adopted in eight states, 7A U.L.A. 40
(Supp. 1987), the reach back period varies from one to four years. UNIF. FRAUDULENT
TRANSFER AcT § 9 (1984). Because the time a transfer occurs under these laws is deter-
mined by reference to priority over others holding an interest in the transferred prop-
erty, 11 U.S.C. § 548(d)(1) (Supp. III 1985); UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER Aar § 6,
issues similar to those raised by the timing rules in the preference provision have to be
resolved. See supra text accompanying notes 151-62.
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548(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code1 85 or equivalent state laws, which
permit avoidance of some transfers made for less than equivalent
value in exchange,' 8 6 because a transfer that gives security for an
antecedent debt is usually deemed made for fair consideration.
187
Several commentators 188 have suggested that the transfer of a
security interest to secure converted obligations in a situation like
Hypothetical A offends the principles of Dean v. Davis 18 9 and thus is
voidable under section 548(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code as a trans-
fer made "with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud"' 190 credi-
tors. In Dean the Supreme Court held that a security interest given
to permit the debtor to make a preferential payment was a fraudu-
lent conveyance. 191 Section 548(a)(1) and Dean, however, require
that the debtor possess the requisite fraudulent intent. 192 In situa-
tions like Hypothetical A, however, only the secured party intends to
exploit its oversecured position. Furthermore, section 548(a)(1) 193
and Dean194 require proof of debtor's subjective intent, an ex-
185 11 U.S.C.A. § 548(a)(2) (West Supp. 1987).
186 See id. § 548(a)(2); UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT §§ 4(a)(2), 5(a); UNIF.
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE AT §§ 4-6 (1918). In addition, the transferor must at the time
of the transfer have been insolvent (or rendered insolvent thereby), too thinly capital-
ized for anticipated business, or intending to incur debts beyond his ability to pay. See
11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) (1982 & Supp. III 1985); UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACr
§§ 4(a)(2), 5(a); UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT §§ 4-6.
187 See 11 U.S.C. § 548(d)(2)(A) (Supp. III 1985) ("value" includes "securing of a
present or antecedent debt of the debtor"); UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACr § 3(a)
("Value is given for a transfer ... if, in exchange for the transfer.., an antecedent debt
is secured .... ); UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT § 3(b) (fair consideration is given
when transfer "is received in good faith to secure a present advance or antecedent debt
in amount not disproportionately small"); see also cases cited in 4 COLLIER ON BANK-
RUPTCY, supra note 150, 548.09, at 548-99 n.2. The "good faith" requirement for "fair
consideration" under the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act mighf open a line of at-
tack against maneuvers such as Lender's where the trustee could invoke this statute.
At least one court has held that giving security for an unsecured claim against an
insolvent debtor involves a transfer for less than fair consideration, because the value of
the claim secured is less than the value of the security. Inland Security Co. v. Estate of
Kirshner, 382 F. Supp. 338 (W.D. Mo. 1974). Commentators have attacked the use of
fraudulent conveyance law to recover transfers made on account of antecedent debts,
however, because such use blurs the distinction between preference and fraudulent con-
veyance principles and undermines the limitations on the former. See D. BAIRD & T.
JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS ON BANKRUPTCY 265-66 (1985); Jackson,
supra note 149, at 783-86.
188 See Kennedy, supra note 174, at 770; see also Carlson & Shupack, supra note 88, at
364 n.323; Justice, supra note 1, at 928.
189 242 U.S. 438 (1917).
190 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1) (Supp. III 1985).
191 242 U.S. at 444-45.
192 See 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 150, 548.02[4]-[5]. Indeed, the Dean
doctrine may require that both debtor and the secured party share an impermissible
purpose. Id. 548.0214], at 548-35 to -36; Justice, supra note 1, at 894.
193 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1) (Supp. III 1985).
194 242 U.S. at 445.
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tremely difficult burden to meet. 195 Finally, the legislative history
indicating that section 547 was intended to overrule King-Porter sug-
gests that the Bankruptcy Code drafters intended preference law to
govern pre-bankruptcy attempts to convert debt. Consequently, sec-
tion 547 may pre-empt fraudulent conveyance law in this area.19 6
Preference law represents the best vehicle for regulating con-
verted indebtedness when the debtor has entered bankruptcy pro-
ceedings. Under current law, however, defensible results can be
achieved only with difficulty. With the exception of the problems
caused by section 547(c)(5), however, the difficulties can be attrib-
uted to the inadequate treatment of converted obligations under
state law. Reforming Article 9 of the U.C.C. would eliminate many




Courts dealing with converted debt have focused on whether,
as a matter of contract law, the security agreement gave the secured
party the power to convert. This is appropriate in most cases, and
courts have succeeded in preventing attempts by overreaching cred-
itors to take advantage of inconspicuous and incomprehensible
dragnet-clause language that informed debtors would likely have
resisted.
Even where debtors have knowingly agreed to allow conver-
sion, however, courts have tended to avoid thorny priority questions
by construing the security agreement not to permit conversion. In
In re E.A. Fretz Co., 19 7 for instance, the dragnet clause in a security
agreement between two sizeable and, presumably, sophisticated
business entities specifically covered claims acquired by assign-
ment.198 Indeed, the agreement plainly stated that the collateral se-
cured claims of Revlon subsidiaries. 199 In short, as a contractual
matter, the security agreement clearly covered claims that Revlon
subsidiaries assigned to the parent company. Nevertheless, the
Fifth Circuit concluded that Revlon did not have a valid lien secur-
195 Justice, supra note 1, at 894-95.
196 Cf Jackson, supra note 149, at 779-80 ("The essence of fraudulent conveyance
law, therefore, is to prevent manipulative activities by the debtor. If the activity in ques-
tion is, at best, a manipulation by a creditor vis-a-vis other creditors, then it should suc-
cumb, if at all, to a preference-type rationale rather than a fraudulent-conveyance-type
rationale.").
197 565 F.2d 366 (5th Cir. 1978).
198 Id at 368 n.2; see supra text accompanying note 76.
199 See supra note 86.
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ing the assigned claims. 200 The holding can only be seen as an at-
tempt to avoid the difficult bankruptcy and priority issues facing the
court.
Existing case law dealing with inflatable liens and similar con-
version devices is generally hostile to their operation. This raises
the possibility, realized in Fretz, that courts will refuse to enforce the
power to convert even when such a ruling is inappropriate. It also
means that the complex priority questions raised by conversion ar-
rangements remain unexplored. It is extraordinarily difficult to con-
strue current Article 9 priority rules to yield justifiable results for
converted debt.20 1 Without the aid of a well-reasoned body of case
law, it may be impossible.
The obvious solution is to amend the law governing secured
transactions to account for the phenomena of converted obligations.
My suggested amendments to Article 9 are set forth in an Appendix.
The proposed amendments can be classified under four headings.
First (and least important), section 9-203(1)(b) is amended to reflect
the unitary concept of a security interest. This clarification merely
provides a stable framework for drafting. I have chosen the unitary
view because it is consistent with the language of current sections 9-
301(4) and 9-307(3).202
Second, the proposed amendments permit the use of inflatable
liens and variants in certain circumstances. Under the proposed re-
visions to section 9-204(3), a security agreement can cover future
advances and other "after-secured obligations," a term defined to
include any obligation not secured when the security interest at-
tached. 20 3 The term thus includes "true" future advances, as well as
assigned debt and similar claims. In the latter case, however, the
parties must "clearly intend" 20 4 the obligations to be covered. The
adverb requires a court to look realistically at the parties' intent and
to discount form language cast in legalese incomprehensible to
most debtors. The definition of "after-secured obligation" excludes
inflatable liens and negotiable liens in consumer transactions. The
devices are easily abused in this context, and consumer transactions
seldom require the flexibility they provide.
Third, the amendments attack the priority problems explored
in this article. Changes to section 9-301(4) give a lien creditor pri-
ority over obligations not "secured by the security interest" (a newly
200 565 F.2d at 375.
201 See supra Parts III and IV.
202 See supra note 143. The amendment to § 9-203(I)(b) is sufficiently subtle to war-
rant a comment explaining its function.




defined phrase20 5) when he becomes a lien creditor, unless the obli-
gations represent "advances" made under the circumstances de-
scribed in the current version of section 9-301(4).2o6 Amendments
to section 9-307(3) make similar changes in the priority rules appli-
cable between secured parties and non-ordinary-course buyers.
The amendments define "advance" as "new value" (a term in cur-
rent sections 9-108 and 9-312(2)) given to or for the benefit of the
debtor after the security interest attaches and in reliance on the se-
curity interest.20 7 To avoid needless litigation, classic future ad-
vances (obligations secured when they arise and representing new
value given by the secured party) are presumed to satisfy the reli-
ance requirement.
Under these proposed amendments, Lender in Hypothetical A
would be subordinate to Tortvictim as to the claim assigned by
Creditor. The changes would also make Lender's maneuver vulner-
able to avoidance under section 547 of the Bankruptcy Code. The
amendments, however, would give the secured party in Heller prior-
ity over lien creditors who levied after the assigning suppliers ex-
tended credit to the debtor and thus would insulate Heller's security
interest from avoidance as a preference.
Section 9-312(7) is completely rewritten. Advances, including
converted claims that meet the definition of an advance, are subject
to the priority rules governing competing security interests in the
current version of section 9-312(7). The amendments date priority
for after-secured obligations not constituting advances from the
time they become "secured by the security interest" or from the
time they receive priority under the rules in section 9-312(5), which-
ever is later.208 The proposal includes amendments to section 9-
313(4) to conform priority in fixtures.
Fourth, the proposal includes amendments to section 9-208
designed to control the use of conversion arrangements to disguise
the extent to which a debtor's assets are encumbered. 20 9 Preventing
this abuse does not require abandoning conversion arrangements,
which can offer the flexibility needed to accomplish perfectly legiti-
mate transactions (as in Heller). The proposed amendments to sec-
tion 9-208 require the secured party, upon the debtor's request, to
205 Id.
206 If converted debt meets the proposed definition of advance, id., the advance
should be deemed made when the obligation arose rather than when it was converted.
A comment to this effect would be appropriate.
207 Id.
208 This change would also correct the problem that arises under current § 9-312(7)
when a "true" advance is made before the security interest is perfected in any way. See
supra note 94.
209 See supra text accompanying notes 32-39.
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issue account statements describing all existing obligations that are
or will be secured by the security interest. This reporting obligation
protects third parties who might otherwise be misled.
210
The notice rules in the proposed revisions to 9-208 are impor-
tant. Problems caused by inadequate disclosure of secured obliga-
tions cannot be lightly dismissed. The experience in Georgia, where
the courts liberally enforced conversion arrangements in real prop-
erty mortgages until stopped by the legislature,21' is instructive:
The rule recognizing the tacking on of other indebtedness by spe-
cial provision in the contract has for many years in this State been
a thorn in the side of title attorneys and title companies, giving
rise to the contention that the holder of a lien junior to an instru-
ment authorizing the tacking on of subsequent indebtedness
places the junior lien holder in the unfortunate position of not
knowing what obligations and priorities are his. This adversely
affects the opportunity of a debtor obtaining junior loans from
another than the first lien holder and places him at the mercy of
the holder of the first lien where additional credit is necessary. It
also places at a disadvantage an investor in junior liens. 2 12
The liberal future advance rules in Article 9, however, already create
the problems noted by the court. The drafters of Article 9 decided
that the advantages of encouraging future advance lending by se-
nior parties outweighed the risks and inconvenience to junior par-
ties. 213 As long as third parties can obtain information about
existing obligations that can be converted into secured debt, which
is possible under the proposed revisions to section 9-208, conver-
sion arrangements do not pose any special problems.
The proposed amendments to Article 9 will not solve all dis-
putes over conversion arrangements. The problems discussed
herein often arise in connection with real estate mortgages; thus,
amendments to state mortgage statutes are also necessary to ensure
proper treatment of conversion arrangements. The proposed
amendments to Article 9 might serve as a model, to be modified in
210 Section 9-208 has many failings beyond those suggested by the problems consid-
ered herein. See SECURED TRANSACTIONS, supra note 37, § 6C.0713][b], at 6C-1 13 to 23;
Justice, supra note 1, at 883-86. The proposed amendments to § 9-208 adopt the cur-
rent version's terminology and approach, which may well be inadequate, but the reform
of which is beyond the scope of this article. The proposed amendments require that the
secured party disclose unmatured and contingent claims, which may address some of the
concerns expressed about such obligations. See supra note 133.
211 See supra text accompanying notes 56-61.
212 Vidalia Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Durrence, 94 Ga. App. 368, 371, 94 S.E.2d 609,611
(1956). Cf Jackson & Kronman, supra note 96, at 1178-82.




light of the varying approaches and terminology in state mortgage
laws.
CONCLUSION
Analysis of the issues raised by inflatable liens and like phenom-
ena reveals significant gaps in U.C.C. Article 9's "comprehensive
scheme for the regulation of security interests in personal property
and fixtures."2 14 The consequences have been confusion over con-
verted obligations and, in certain cases, injustice. More disturb-
ingly, the unsettled state of current law encourages the abuse of
conversion arrangements in the future. The potential for abuse is
greatest when the debtor has become insolvent, because the failure
of state law to deal adequately with conversion arrangements under-
mines provisions of federal bankruptcy law designed to regulate se-
curity interests in this critical area.
Although the current Article 9 scheme has survived despite its
imperfections and can be made to yield proper results in some situa-
tions, amending Article 9 as proposed in the Appendix would en-
sure a rational and predictable approach to converted obligations.
Inflatable liens and similar arrangements have appeared with fre-
quency sufficient to reveal their utility and their potential for abuse.
Both aspects deserve a legislative response.
214 U.C.C. § 9-101 comment (1972).
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APPENDIX
Proposed Amendments to Article 9
Add the following new definitions to § 9-105(1):
(o)An "advance" is new value given to or for the benefit of the debtor in
reliance upon a security interest after such security interest has attached. New
value given by the secured party is presumed to be given in reliance upon a
security interest if the resulting obligation is secured by the security interest when
the new value is given.
(p) "After-secured obligation" means any enforceable obligation that is not se-
cured by the security interest involved at the time the security interest attaches.
Except to the extent the collateral is consumer goods, after-secured obligations
may include obligations assigned to the secured party after the security interest
attached and pre-existing obligations to a party who was assigned the security
interest.
(q)An obligation or indebtedness is "'secured by the security interest" when and
to the extent that the obligation has arisen and is covered by an effective security
agreement creating or providing for such security interest, provided that there
has been no period thereafter when such obligation was not covered by such a
security agreement.
Amend § 9-203(1)(b) to read as follows:
(b)some value has been given; and
Amend § 9-204(3) to read as follows:
(3) Obligations covered by a security agreement may include
(1)future advances, whether or not such advances are given pursuant to com-
mitment (subsection (1) of Section 9-105), and (2) if the parties clearly so
intend, other after-secured obligations.
Replace the first sentence of § 9-208(1) with the following:
(1) A debtor may sign a statement of obligations with a request that the
statement be approved or corrected and returned to the debtor. The statement of
obligations shall indicate what the debtor believes to be (1) the aggregate
amount of unpaid indebtedness as of a specified date, and (2) any other obliga-
tions existing as of the specified date (including unliquidated, contingent or
unmatured obligations) which are or will be secured by the security interest.
Amend § 9-208(2) as follows:
-Add the following sentence after the first sentence:
If the secured party complies and the request included a statement of obliga-
tions, the secured party may claim a security interest against persons who rea-
sonably relied on the statement of obligations (as corrected in the response) only
with respect to (1) the indebtedness and other obligations indicated on the state-
ment as corrected in the response, and (2) advances made after the date speci-
fied in the request.
-Replace the portion of the third sentence that follows the semico-
lon with the following:
and if the debtor has properly included in his request a good faith
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statement of obligations, the secured party may claim a security interest
against persons misled by his failure to comply only with respect to (1) the
indebtedness and other obligations indicated on the statement and (2) advances
made after the date specified in the request; and if the debtor has properly in-
cluded in his request a list of the collateral the secured party may claim a secur-
ity interest against persons misled by his failure to comply only with respect to
collateral indicated in the statement.
Amend § 9-301(4) to read as follows:
(4) A person who becomes a lien creditor while a security inter-
est is perfected takes subject to the security interest only to the ex-
tent that it secures
(a) obligations secured by the security interest before he becomes a lien
creditor; and
(b) advances made within 45 days after he becomes a lien creditor or
made without knowledge of the lien or pursuant to a commitment en-
tered into without knowledge of the lien.
Amend § 9-307(3) to read as follows:
(3) A buyer other than a buyer in ordinary course of business
(subsection (1) of this section) takes free of a security interest to the
extent that it secures obligations not secured by the security interest at the
time of the purchase, except for advances made at or within 45 days after the
purchase and before the secured party acquires knowledge of the purchase, and
advances made pursuant to a commitment entered into without knowledge of
the purchase and before the expiration of the 45 days period.
Amend § 9-312(7) to read as follows:
(7) The priority of a security interest securing after-secured obligations as
against a conflicting security interest in the same collateral shall be deteimined
by the following rules:
(a) To the extent the security interest secures advances made while the
security interest was perfected by filing, the taking of possession, or
under Section 8-321 on securities, the priority of such security interest
is governed by subsection (5).
(b) To the extent the security interest secures advances made pursuant to
a commitment given before or while the security interest is perfected by
filing, the taking of possession, or under Section 8-321 on securities,
the priority of such security interest is governed by subsection (5).
(c) In all other cases, the security interest has priority from the time the
after-secured obligation is secured by the security interest or the time
the security interest would have priority under the rules in subsection
(5), whichever is later.
Amend § 9-313(4) to read as follows:
(4) A perfected security interest in fixtures has priority over the





(b) the security interest is perfected by a fixture filing before
the interest of the encumbrancer or owner is of record, the security
interest secures obligations secured by the security interest before the interest of
the encumbrancer or owner is of record or advances made thereafter, the se-
curity interest has priority over any conflicting interest of a prede-
cessor in title of the encumbrancer or owner, and the debtor has an
interest of record in the real estate or is in possession of the real
estate; or
(c) the fixtures are readily removable factory or office machines
or readily removable replacements of domestic appliances which are
consumer goods, the security interest secures obligations secured by the secur-
ity interest before the goods become fixtures or advances made thereafter, and
before the goods become fixtures the security interest is perfected
by any method permitted by this Article; or
(d) the conflicting interest is a lien on the real estate obtained
by legal or equitable proceedings after the security interest was per-
fected by any method permitted by this Article, and the security interest
secures obligations secured by the security interest before the lien was obtained or
advances made thereafter.
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